

Today's discussion

- ◆ **Presentation Overview and Summary Recommendations**
- ◆ **Mortgage Market Trends**
- ◆ **Monoline Lifecycles**
- ◆ **Phineas Valuation**
- ◆ **Citigroup Recommendations**

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Strategic questions for Phineas' board of directors

- I. How valuable is Phineas to shareholders given its traditional business model and current market and regulatory environments? How does that value – and the business performance it implies – compare to comparable companies?
- II. How valuable is the charter to shareholders, net of its costs? How are the benefits and costs of the charter distributed across Phineas' activities?
- III. How permanent are the shifts we've seen in the market and regulatory environments and how intense should we expect future change to be?
- IV. What kind of threat do those changes pose to Phineas' business model?
- V. What is Phineas good at, beyond leveraging the benefits of its charter status?
- VI. What are the market opportunities for future earnings per share growth and how does those align with what Phineas is good at and with its charter benefits, costs and constraints?
- VII. What strategies and tactics are available to optimize shareholder value, within the charter and through alternative regulatory frameworks?
- VIII. What can we learn from other industries and other organizations that have experienced analogous pressures and challenges?
- IX. Is a full privatization strategy currently in the best interests of Phineas' shareholders?
- X. Under what conditions should Phineas pursue privatization?

Citigroup observations

- ◆ Phineas business model is increasingly at risk of being marginalized
 - ◆ Primary market factors
 - ◆ Secondary market factors
- ◆ The business cannot exist without the benefits provided by the charter
 - ◆ Size, scale and leverage
 - ◆ Funding cost and access to capital markets
- ◆ A combination of these factors drive our view that the two “extreme” outcomes – stay the course and full privatization – are, in fact, not options
- ◆ Phineas is not a “growth company”; the core business should grow EPS at mid/high single digits

Company	Phineas	S&P 500 ^(a)	Countrywide	American Express	Wells Fargo	SLM Corp
P/ 2006E	8.3x	15.8x	8.7x	15.2x	12.2x	17.2x
LT EPS Growth	10.0%	12.0%	12.0%	13.0%	11.0%	15.0%
- ◆ Phineas, however, can create significant value to shareholders by extending its business and returning to an outward rather than inward focus
- ◆ A tracking stock would allow segmentation of the investor base for the portfolio business
 - ◆ Investors find the company’s result very opaque due to FAS 133
- ◆ What would be the “tipping point” for the charter to be value destructive?
 - ◆ There would need to be significant legislative changes for the charter to deteriorate in value (e.g., a significant level of the book of business, lower leverage or escalating mission costs)

Citigroup recommendations on new business initiatives

- ◆ Diversification would decrease the dependence on volatile portfolio earnings, enhance earnings growth and play to Phineas' competitive strengths
- ◆ We have focused on initiatives which we believe are closely aligned with Phineas' customer base and capabilities
- ◆ These initiatives would allow Phineas to maximize the value of the charter and would result in a business serving the mortgage market (and the mission) more broadly
- ◆ We further believe that becoming a full service provider would have a positive impact on Phineas' employees

Stand-alone Scenario	Proposed new business initiatives
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Current share price of \$59 is a 6% discount to sum-of-the-parts DCF value of \$63 ◆ Analysts use forward P/E to value Phineas, which leads to wide range of estimates due to lack of transparency ◆ A comparison of values with and without the charter results in a charter value of approximately \$29 per share (50% of share price) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Expand Guarantee business into non-traditional products (Alt-A, Sub-prime) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Incremental NPV/share: \$5.72 ◆ Asset management & risk analytics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Incremental NPV/share: \$2.31 ◆ Mortgage insurance <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➔ Incremental NPV/share: \$3.07

Framework for assessing Phineas' strategic alternatives

In assessing strategic alternatives to maximize long-term Phineas shareholder value, Citigroup considered the following on both a whole company and business line basis:

- ◆ Competitive advantages of Phineas
 - ✦ Charter advantages versus charter costs
 - ✦ Competitive advantages within and outside the mortgage industry
- ◆ Valuation and financial impact of proposed strategic alternatives
 - ✦ Actual economic returns vs required risk-adjusted returns
 - ✦ Valuation and financial impact (including and excluding charter)
- ◆ Long-term market opportunity
 - ✦ Phineas competitive positioning
 - ✦ Environmental trends
- ◆ Implications of strategic alternatives
 - ✦ Business line interrelationships
 - ✦ Customer relationships
 - ✦ Mortgage market

Citigroup's observation of Phineas

- The “charter” is Phineas’ core asset (accounting for up to 50% of current market capitalization), allowing for operating scale, access to capital markets and low cost financing that are unprecedented among financial services companies
- Mission costs however, continue to increase
- Market conditions are also evolving in ways that have reduced Phineas’ ability to grow at historical rates and levels of profitability
- We have used several methodologies to value Phineas, which indicate that Phineas trades at a discount to its sum-of-the-parts valuation
- Given Phineas competitive advantages, we believe that achieving the broad goal of enhancing market liquidity for mortgages is consistent with enhancing shareholder value
- Distinctive competencies that Phineas can transfer beyond its current business and into new initiatives include:
 - ◆ Interest rate risk analytics (and associated brand)
 - ◆ Mortgage credit analysis
 - ◆ Capital markets expertise

Citigroup's recommendations for Phineas

- Citigroup's recommendations to enhance Phineas shareholder value have been made under the following assumptions:
 - ✦ Current regulatory and charter constraints have been "assumed away"
 - ✦ Phineas must currently have, or be able to readily obtain, the required key competencies
 - ✦ Recommendations must be executable and meaningful to valuation and both net income and EPS growth
- **Recommendation #1:** Optimize value of portfolio business
 - ✦ Manage portfolio to optimize returns, not to achieve "earnings" growth
 - ✦ Isolate portfolio business via tracking stock structure to optimize investor interest
 - ✦ Reduce use of synthetic derivatives
- **Recommendation #2:** Consider three new business lines
 - ✦ Non-conforming residential mortgage guaranty / conduit sub-prime
 - ✦ Mortgage insurance
 - ✦ Asset management / risk analytics
- **Recommendation #3:** Consider comprehensive investor relations program
 - ✦ Re-introduce tutorial on "how Phineas makes money"
 - ✦ Focus on communicating a non-GAAP financial measure consistent with how the business is managed

The “dustbin”

Ideas	Reasons to dismiss
◆ Full privatization	◆ We valued the business with and without the charter: the resulting higher capital requirements and funding cost, and the necessary downsizing of the portfolio and guaranty businesses lead to a valuation difference, or implied value of the charter, of c. \$29 per share
◆ Full exit from portfolio business	◆ A full exit from the portfolio business would lead to a multi-year run-off, in which the infrastructure needs to be maintained ◆ This strategy would only make sense if Phineas could replace lost earnings with higher earnings growth businesses consistent with core competencies and only if this did not compromise the single family business
◆ Transform portfolio business into REIT	◆ A REIT structure would require separate taxable and non-taxable subsidiaries for the portfolio and guarantee business, which would only be possible without the charter ◆ The portfolio business would need to be significantly downsized; tax savings would not exceed the impact of higher financing costs, lower leverage and a smaller portfolio
◆ Transform into a depository (acquire retail deposits)	◆ Acquiring an inexpensive funding source would require a significant investment in either long-term de novo branch building or acquisitions at high premiums ◆ Given the size of the portfolio assets, a dominant share of the U.S. deposit market would be required to have a meaningful impact on earnings ◆ Higher bank capital requirements (5%) would dilute ROE
◆ Spin-off of multi-family business	◆ Spinning-off the multi-family business would raise questions by the market given its small size and high core profitability compared to the overall business ◆ The multi-family business is “mission-rich”; a spin-off would simply lead to a transfer of mission costs to other business lines unless goals can be acquired at lower cost
◆ Preemptive capital raising	◆ Would erode Phineas’ existing value per share as additional capital cannot be deployed above the cost of equity and would thus dilute ROE for existing shareholders

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Shifting mortgage industry landscape

Cyclical




Structural

Issues	Type Of Trend	Impact On Phineas
❖ Consolidation amongst top originators	❖ Competitive	❖ Larger competitors compete more aggressively for assets, have greater pricing power and ability to develop new products; increased vertical integration of Wall Street firms
❖ Accelerated use of private label products	❖ Secondary Market	❖ Decrease in guaranty business as issuers pursue alternative executions
❖ Decreased spreads on subordinated bonds	❖ Secondary Market	❖ Increases relative attractiveness of private label execution, driving business away from Phineas
❖ Increased (hybrid) ARM origination	❖ Primary Market	❖ Lower share of originations sold to Phineas due to its lower market share in the ARM market versus fixed rate products
❖ Increased sub-prime and Alt-A origination	❖ Primary Market	❖ Reduction in share of agency-eligible loans reduces Phineas' target market
❖ Growth of affordability products (IO, Option ARMs)	❖ Primary Market	❖ Product innovation reduces Phineas' target market
❖ Increased participation among both traditional and new investors including foreign central banks, REITs, CDOs and hedge funds	❖ Competitive	❖ Crowded competitive landscape seeking to acquire assets causes spread compression, thus limiting Phineas' opportunities
❖ Impact of Basel II implementation	❖ Regulatory	❖ Retaining mortgages will become a more attractive opportunity for depositories
❖ Competition from Freddie Mac	❖ Competitive	❖ Freddie Mac's focus on regaining market share from Phineas could result in a permanent loss of market share
❖ Fall in the rate of conforming mortgage originations	❖ Primary Market	❖ Agency eligibility by loan size limits growth
❖ Potentially slowing home price appreciation	❖ Macro-economic	❖ Slowing home price appreciation may impede growth
❖ Growing homeownership rates	❖ Macro-economic	❖ Increased mortgage debt creates increased market opportunity; increased volume for guaranty business may be partially offset by use of non-conforming products

Depository institutions will likely increase holdings of mortgage assets

- ◆ Depositories have increased mortgage holdings relative to total assets every year since 1998, bringing their market share to its highest level since 2000
- ◆ Basel II is likely to accelerate this trend as capital requirements against mortgages held are set to decrease beginning in 2008

Presence of depositories in mortgage




Implications of Basel II

- Relative to the current standard approach, risk weightings for mortgages on residential property will decrease from 50% to 35%
- The 10 largest U.S. banks are likely to be required to use the advanced internal ratings ("A-IRB") approach, with the next 10 largest banks likely to adopt such approach voluntarily (the remaining U.S. banks are expected to continue to use the standard approach)
 - * Capital required to be held against mortgages will likely decrease for the banks adopting A-IRB
 - * These 20 banks may then have additional incentives to retain mortgages in their own portfolios rather than sell them to Phineas
 - * These banks may also have greater incentives to compete with the GSEs in purchasing mortgages from other originators



Primary market consolidation increases pricing pressure on G-fees and portfolio assets

- ◆ The drive to capitalize on economies of scale and scope have led to rapid consolidation within the mortgage industry over the past 10 years
- ✱ The consolidation of top originators has created competitive pressures as larger, more efficient originators are able to price mortgage loans and securities more aggressively in the secondary market





Phineas' market share has declined as ARM origination volume has accelerated

- ◆ The share of mortgage originations comprised of adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs") is generally tied to both absolute and relative levels of interest rates
- ◆ Other factors have also led to increased ARM originations:
 - ✦ Increased popularity of hybrid ARMs
 - ✦ Growth of the sub-prime market, of which approximately 70% of originations are ARMs
- ◆ Phineas has historically captured a smaller share of the ARM market compared to the fixed market
- ◆ The popularity of hybrid ARMs may signal a structural change in the fixed-rate versus ARM composition of mortgage originations




A shift toward non-traditional products diminishes Phineas' competitive advantages

- ◆ The rapid increase in home prices, combined with increased competitive pressures, has led originators to offer "affordability" products such as interest only ARMs
- ◆ The decline in refinancing activity in the prime market has left lenders with excess capacity, and combined with the favorable credit cycle, has spurred activity in non-prime markets such as Alt-A and sub-prime
- ◆ The increase in the conforming loan limit, which is based on national home price increases, has not kept pace with the growth of home prices in high volume states, such as California.




Private label market share surpassed Phineas in 2004

- ◆ Economies of scale created through originator consolidation have increased opportunities for securitization in the private label market, which had not previously been economically viable due to the fixed costs associated with securitization
- ◆ In addition, due to Phineas' limited presence in the sub-prime and Alt-A sectors, and reduced role in the ARM market, originators have gravitated towards selling or securitizing via the private label markets





Increasing home ownership rates have a positive impact on Phineas

- ◆ After remaining relatively stable from 1976 to 1994, the rate of homeownership in the United States has grown steadily
 - ✧ Lower mortgage rates and strong economic growth have increased homeownership
 - ✧ The evolution of the sub-prime and Alt-A markets have contributed to increased homeownership opportunities for those who do not qualify for conventional loans. Loan originations by non-traditional lenders grew by approximately 31% annually between 1994 and 2004, compared to 14% annually for all originations



Mortgage credit performance has varying implications for Phineas' business lines


- ◆ Home price appreciation and the resultant equity build-up have mitigated credit losses
- ◆ There has been a rapid onset of affordability products, however, many of which contain layered risks
 - ◆ Credit performance of these loans are expected to be worse than traditional loans due to new loan features which may reduce borrowers' ability to meet monthly payments (interest only and ARM reset dates) and loans which have reduced the amount of equity in borrowers' homes (higher LTV, second liens)
- ◆ Reduced perceived risk, limited yield opportunities, and new pools of capital (i.e. REITs and hedge funds) have increased demand for subordinated securities and driven a dramatic reduction in spreads which has increased the relative attractiveness of private label execution
- ◆ On the contrary an adverse credit event may provide more business opportunities for Phineas if investors become less risk tolerant



A reduction in home price appreciation may slow Phineas' growth

- ◆ Strong home price appreciation combined with record low interest rates has fueled robust growth in the housing market over the past two years
- ◆ Growth in home prices has led to a change in consumer behavior as borrowers have extracted excess equity via home equity products
- ◆ Home price appreciation is a major factor in the extremely low credit costs in the mortgage sector
- ◆ A reduction in home price appreciation would increase frequency and severity of losses


Home price appreciation



Today's discussion


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Lifecycle dynamics of monoline lenders




Historical stress factors	Casualties	Impact of charter
Funding / liquidity	Household, Finova, Associates	Insulates Phineas
Disintermediation / growth	First USA, CIT	Hinders Phineas
Lack of diversification	MBNA	Hinders Phineas

Shrinking universe of monoline lenders



EPS growth rates have generally trended downward for large cap financials



Competitive positioning of monolines

Top 10 mortgage originators			
1994		2004	
Company	Market Share	Company	Market Share
Countrywide	4.2%	Countrywide	12.9%
Norwest	3.2	Wells Fargo	10.6
Prudential	3.1	Washington Mutual	9.1
Chase Manhattan	2.3	JP Morgan Chase	7.0
Chemical Residential	2.1	Bank of America	5.1
Fleet Mortgage	1.8	Citigroup	3.7
GE Capital	1.6	GMAC	3.1
GMAC	1.4	Ameriquest	2.9
Bank of America	1.3	National City	2.3
North American Mortgage	1.3	ABN AMRO	2.0
22.3%		58.7%	

Source: The 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual.

Top 10 credit card issuers			
1994		2004 ^(a)	
Company	Market Share	Company	Market Share
Citigroup	17.4%	Bank of America	25.3%
MBNA America	7.8	JP Morgan Chase	23.8
AT&T Universal	5.5	Citigroup	20.5
First Chicago	5.4	Capital One	9.4
First USA	4.9	HSBC Bank	4.0
Household Bank	4.8	Washington Mutual	3.3
Chase Manhattan	4.6	Wells Fargo	2.4
Chemical Bank	4.0	U.S. Bancorp	1.9
Bank of America	3.6	USAA Federal Savings	1.3
Signet Bank	3.4		
61.4%		66.4%	

Based on volume outstanding of top 50 bank credit card issuers.

(a) Pro forma for recent mergers.

Top 10 branch based consumer finance companies			
1996		2004	
Company	Market Share	Company	Market Share
Household	35.1%	HSBC	43.1%
Associates First Capital	27.0	Citigroup	37.7
Beneficial	13.9	Wells Fargo	12.0
Commercial Credit	6.7	AIG	7.2
Avco	5.5		
Norwest Finance	4.5		
Transamerica Finance	3.5		
American General Finance	2.1		
Aristar	1.7		
100.0%		100.0%	

NB: Market share based on sum of top 9 or 4 consumer finance receivables.

Top mortgage insurers			
1994		2004	
Company	Market Share	Company	Market Share
GE Capital	27.6%	Mortgage Guaranty Insurance	23.2%
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance	25.7	PMI Mortgage Insurance	18.7
PMI Mortgage Insurance	13.8	Radian Guaranty	15.9
AIG	13.3	AIG	13.5
Republic Mortgage Insurance	8.7	Genworth Financial	13.5
Commonwealth	7.8	Republic Mortgage Insurance	10.3
Amerin Guaranty	1.9	Triad Guaranty Insurance	4.8
Triad Guaranty Insurance	1.2		
100.0%		100.0%	

Source: The 2005 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual.

Note: Market share based on sum of top 7 or 8 mortgage insurers insurers in 1994 and 2004 respectively.

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Equity Market Considerations

Comparative market statistics

Institution/Sector	7/11/2005 Agg Mkt Cap	Forward 2006 P/E	Price / Book Value ^(a)	2006E PEG Ratio	Current Divd. Yield ^(b)
Phineas	\$57,164	8.3x	2.2x	83%	1.8%
Freddie Mac	45,529	9.4	1.7	99	1.8
Mortgage Banks	27,130	8.8	2.1	66	2.4
Depositories w/ Mortgage Platforms	322,412	11.1	1.8	112	3.5
Multi-Family Banks	8,012	11.9	1.5	119	11.1
Thrifts	56,118	11.3	2.2	101	2.4
Financial Guarantors	17,903	10.1	1.3	79	0.7
Mortgage Insurers	14,003	8.6	1.2	71	0.5
Residential MBS REITs	4,920	8.3	1.0	199	11.0
Commercial MBS REITs	2,483	9.9	1.7	158	8.3


Source: IDD, SNL Datasource.

Mortgage Banks: Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC), PHH Corp. (PHH), Indymac Bancorp Inc. (NDE); Depositories w/ Mortgage Platform: Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), Bank of America Corp. (BAC), National City Corp. (NCC), North Fork Bancorporation (NFB); Multi-Family Banks: New York Community Bancorp Inc. (NYB), Independence Community Bank Corp. (ICBC); Thrifts: Golden West Financial Corp. (GDW), Washington Mutual Inc. (WM); RMBS REITs: Redwood Trust Inc. (RWT), Annaly Mortgage Mgmt Inc. (NLY), Anworth Mtg Asset Corp. (ANH), Luminent Mortgage Capital (LUM), MFA Mortgage Investments (MFA); CMBS REITs: Newcastle Investment Corp. (NCT), Anthracite Capital Inc. (AHR), Capital Trust (CT); Financial Guarantors: MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group (ABK), Assured Guaranty Ltd (AGO); Mortgage Insurers: MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN), PMI Group Inc. (PMI)

(a) Book Value as on December 31, 2004. Phineas book value equals \$35.5 billion total equity less \$9.108 billion in preferred shares, per Phineas management.

(b) Last quarter annualized.

Historical stock price performance versus portfolio and EPS growth




	1998				1999				2000				2001				2002				2003				2004				2005	
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
EPS Growth (%)	16	16	12	12	13	14	14	16	16	12	16	14	7	33	9	70	7	6	(18)	(51)	65	(24)	158	135	(2)	1	NA	NA	NA	NA
Core Earnings Growth (%)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	18	21	22	25	23	22	22	19	24	20	13	7	10	3	NA	NA	NA	NA
Portfolio Growth (%)	NA	NA	NA	NA	35	36	34	26	22	16	13	16	19	21	20	16	15	12	9	12	42	26	15	18	8	9	(1)	1	(2)	(7)

Source: Company reports and Powerdata.

Note: Growth rates represent year-over-year quarterly growth. 2Q 2005 Portfolio growth from May 2005 company update. Earnings data are prior to restatement. Phineas adopted FAS 133 on Jan 1, 2001.

Historical price / NTM earnings relative to the S&P 500

	High	Median	Low	Current	Phineas as a Percent of:	High	Median	Low	Current
Phineas	21.0x	12.5x	6.9x	8.1x	Freddie Mac	112%	96%	75%	81%
Freddie Mac	24.1	12.6	7.6	10.0	Thriffs & Mortgage Banks	226	124	63	75
Thriffs & Mortgage Banks	15.6	10.3	6.6	10.8	Mortgage Insurers	244	118	76	89
Mortgage Insurers	18.4	9.9	5.9	9.1	S&P 500	92	66	41	50
S&P 500	28.1	18.8	12.6	16.3					




Source: Powerdata and IBES estimates.

N.B. Thriffs and Mortgage Banks include Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC), Golden West Financial (GDW) and Washington Mutual Inc. (WM). Mortgage Insurers include MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and PMI Group Inc. (PMI). Market data as of 7/11/2005.

Historical PEG ratio

	High	Median	Low	Current	Phineas as a Percent of:	High	Median	Low	Current
Phineas	161%	93%	56%	81%	Freddie Mac	127%	104%	70%	73%
Freddie Mac	161	89	51	111	Thriffs & Mortgage Banks	218	112	59	82
Thriffs & Mortgage Banks	120	87	53	98	Mortgage Insurers	269	124	71	107
Mortgage Insurers	121	74	46	76					



Source: Powerdata and IBES estimates.
N.B. Thriffs and Mortgage Banks include Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC), Golden West Financial (GDW) and Washington Mutual Inc. (WM). Mortgage Insurers include MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and PMI Group Inc. (PMI). Market data as of 7/11/2005.


Total returns to shareholders analysis

Total Return Analysis					
	Actual Return	Annual Total Return since:			
	Since 1/1/2005	1/1/2004	1/1/2002	1/1/2000	1/1/1995
Phineas	(15.0%)	(11.9%)	(5.7%)	1.6%	14.4%
<u>GSEs</u>					
Freddie Mac	(6.9)	10.6	2.4	7.9	17.4
<u>Thriffs</u>					
Golden West Financial Corporation	10.0	19.9	26.5	30.9	26.1
Washington Mutual, Inc.	1.5	6.6	9.6	21.4	20.6
<u>Mortgage Banks</u>					
Countrywide Financial Corporation	11.7	36.9	48.1	40.1	26.8
<u>Mortgage Insurers</u>					
MGIC Investment Corporation	(4.9)	10.5	1.8	3.7	13.4
Radian Group Inc.	(9.2)	(0.7)	3.3	15.2	18.9
PMI Group, Inc.	(5.5)	3.9	4.3	10.2	12.0
<u>Market Indices</u>					
S&P 500	2.6	7.0	1.4	(2.6)	10.1
S&P Financial Services Index	(3.8)	4.4	3.8	5.1	14.1

Source: Powerdata, Bloomberg and WinEZ. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Total return calculated as total dividends reinvested plus stock price appreciation.


Does Freddie Mac provide a roadmap to recovery?



- Phineas ——— FRE
- (a) 1/23/2003: Freddie Mac announces it will revise earnings for at least the previous two years.
 - (b) 6/10/2003: Freddie Mac fires 3 top executives amid allegations of failure to cooperate with investigations into accounting practices. Gregory Parseghian named as new CEO.
 - (c) 8/22/2003: Federal regulators order Freddie Mac's board to remove Gregory Parseghian from position as CEO due to his involvement in improper accounting practices.
 - (d) 11/21/2003: Freddie Mac reports corrected financial statements for the previous three years but announces that it is still unable to provide timely earnings reports and will not provide financials until mid-2004.
 - (e) 12/8/2003: Freddie Mac names Richard Syron as new CEO.
 - (f) 3/30/2004: Regulators announce that Phineas may have to correct published financial statements as a result of the government accounting review.
 - (g) 9/22/2004: Government regulators report that Phineas used improper accounting methods that raise questions about financial report and management quality.
 - (h) 11/15/2004: Phineas announces that it cannot meet deadline to file 10-Q and may be required to record \$9 billion of previously unreported losses.
 - (i) 12/22/2004: Phineas' board replaces CEO Franklin Raines and CFO Timothy Howard amid accounting scandal.
 - (j) 3/31/2005: Freddie Mac announces 2004 results bringing its financial reporting current
 - (k) 6/2/2005: Phineas names Dan Mudd as new CEO.


Source: Powerdata and IBES estimates. Market data as of 7/11/2005.

Historical sum-of-the-parts valuation based on reported business line earnings contribution



Business Line Pre-Tax Core Earnings Contribution

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005E
Guaranty	36%	37%	37%	43%	38%	37%	30%	31%	38%	43%	43%
Portfolio	64	63	63	57	62	63	70	69	62	57	57





Source: Powerdata, SNL Datasource, IBES estimates, Bloomberg and company filings. Market data as of 07/11/2005.




Note: Business line earnings provided by management. Historical sum-of-the-parts valuation performed by calculating Phineas' quarterly earnings for the past 10 years, applying the respective business line contribution to determine income from guaranty and portfolio businesses and applying the historical price to forward multiple of respective peers to determine the value of each part.

(a) Based on 2006Q1 annualized earnings estimate.

Equity research analysts' perspectives on Phineas




Source: IBES estimates and Bloomberg.
Note: Numbers in columns denote median values.



34 Source: Powerdata, IBES and Bloomberg. Note: Market data as of 7/11/2005.
Large Banks includes Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Citigroup Inc. (C), and JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM). Prime Originators includes Washington Mutual Inc. (WM), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) and Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC).



Decomposition of Phineas' P/E valuation multiples

- While growth expectations and returns are important drivers of valuation multiples, the cost of capital is also critical





P/E franchise factor model: Phineas vs Peers

Over time Phineas' Franchise P/E has shrunk considerably...



...while investors still attribute a strong Franchise Factor to Phineas, their current view is that Phineas' EPS, and the mortgage industry in general, will contract



Investor considerations / opinions

- ▲ “I am interested in the GSEs: adjustable-rate product will become less popular relative to fixed-rate product as the yield curve flattens.”
- ▼ “Phineas' financials are too opaque and complicated to understand.” “My time is better spent analyzing alternatives in the financial stock sector.” Hedging activities at Phineas are indecipherable.
- ▼ “How do I derive a true operating result for Phineas?” “I am concerned about sequential-quarter volatility in reported results.”
- ▼ The US has enjoyed a terrific appreciation in home ownership and home values. “We are in the 11th inning.” “The market is increasingly speculative and I don't want to be exposed.”
- ▼ New mortgage product creation and usage is elevating credit risk in the system, with uncertain consequences for Phineas and investors.
- ▼ “I prefer to own the originators such as Wells Fargo and Countrywide.” “I prefer to own the mortgage insurers--they have excess capital that can be returned to shareholders, and inexpensive valuations.”
- ▼ “Am I still exposed to legislative risk?” “I have no insight into the legislative process and potential outcomes.”

Price/ EPS is most prevalent valuation metric

Institution/ Name of Analyst	Analyst coverage area ^(a)	Valuation Methodology					Rating	Target price	LTG
		Price / 2006E GAAP EPS	Price / Core BV	Price / Fair BV	DCF	Additional methodologies			
Lehman Brothers/ Bruce Harting ^(b)	Specialty/ Mortgage Finance			●	●	DCF based on liquidation	Overweight/ Neutral	\$100.00	13.0%
Bear Stearns & Co./ David Hochstim	Mortgage Finance	●		●		Residual income valuation	Outperform	89.00	10.0
UBS/ Eric Wasserstrom	Mortgage Finance	●		●	●	DCF based on liquidation	Buy	88.00	12.0
A.G. Edwards & Son/ Matthew Park	Thriffs & Mortgage Finance	●					Buy	82.00	5.0
JP Morgan/ George Sacco	Mortgage Finance		●				Overweight	80.00	--
Piper Jaffray & Co./ Robert Napoli	Mortgage Finance	●					Outperform	79.00	--
Merrill Lynch/ Kenneth Bruce	Consumer Finance / Credit Cards	●					Buy	76.50	--
Sanford Bernstein & Co./ Jonathan Gray ^(b)	Mortgage Finance	●					Outperform	74.00	--
Morgan Stanley/ Kenneth Posner ^(b)	Mortgage Finance			●	●	Multi-factor economic capital model	Equal Weight/ Attractive	67.00	--
Friedman, Billings, Ramsey/ Paul Miller	Mortgage Finance		●			Projections of core capital level	Market Perform	65.00	8.7
Prudential Equity Group/ Bradley Ball	Mortgage Finance			●		Blended portfolio metric	Neutral Weight	63.00	15.0
Wachovia/ Jim Shanahan	Mortgage Finance	●					--	--(c)	8.0

Reconciling management estimates to median public EPS estimates

(\$ in millions except per share figures)

Earnings Contribution	2006E
Per Share Basis	
Range of IBES Estimates (a)	\$6.25 - \$7.69
Median IBES Estimates (a)	\$7.15
Management Projected EPS (b)	7.10
Shortfall	\$0.05
Shortfall - Total	\$47
	Total % of Total
Single Family	\$2,934 43%
Multi Family	277 4
Portfolio	3,663 53
Total Projected Core Earnings	\$6,874 100%

(a) As of 07/11/2005.

(b) Aggregate of individual business line projections, per management estimates. Assumes 967.9mm shares outstanding.

Whole Company Valuation

Citigroup's approach to valuation

	Relevant parameters	Comments
Comparable Company Analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Price to 2006 Earnings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selected categories of comparable companies (Countrywide, mortgage insurers, thrifts, FRE) Based on IBES EPS estimates for Phineas as a whole, based on management core earnings estimates for business line valuations
ROACE versus Price-to-Book Regression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Return on Equity Price to Book 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regression of ROE and P/B of a peer group to derive an implied P/B multiple Implied P/B multiple to be applied to Phineas common equity
Sum-of-the-Parts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCF ROE - P/B Regression 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Value Single- and Multi-Family and Portfolio businesses individually on the basis of DCF resulting in an overall value for Phineas Based on management projections of required capital and core earnings ROE – P/B regressions for multiple peer groups imply a profitability adjusted P/B multiple for each business line
Discounted Cash Flow	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cost of equity: 7.7% Terminal value earnings multiple for whole company, single family and multi-family Terminal value book multiple for portfolio 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DCF for the whole company based on I/B/E/S EPS estimates and capital requirements derived from the business line assumptions DCF for the business lines based on management projections of core earnings projections and capital requirements Cost of equity based on a CAPM approach with a 5% EMRP and a 5-year weekly adjusted beta of 0.68

Status quo versus private company DCF valuation assumptions

	With Charter	Without Charter
Tax-Rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none">27% effective tax rate	<ul style="list-style-type: none">31% effective tax rate
Single- and Multi-Family	<ul style="list-style-type: none">58.5 basis points required capital (assumes 30% surcharge to continue)Single family book of business grows at a constant rate of 3.1% from 2007 (46.1% of mortgage debt outstanding growth)Net income reduced by mission costs (incorporated in management projections)Beta of 0.68 (cost of equity 7.7%)Terminal value: 9.0x P/E multiple	<ul style="list-style-type: none">66.4 basis points required capital (median of three financial guarantors)Single family book of business shrinks by 15% per annum beginning in 2006. Single family book of business reduced to \$1.2 trillion by 2009Net income increased by 5% to adjust for "mission costs"Single-family beta of 1.07 (median of peer group)Multi-family beta of 0.89 (median of peer group)Terminal value: 9.0x P/E multiple
Portfolio	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Portfolio growth based on management assumptions (0% growth through 2009)2.67% required capitalFunding costs reflect management estimates on April 27Beta of 0.68 (cost of equity of 7.7%)Terminal value book multiple of 1.2x	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Portfolio in run-off; balance is reduced to \$228 billion by 2009Assumed to be no "mission costs" associated with the Portfolio business <p><u>Valuation as Bank</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">5.0% required capital (leverage ratio for "well-capitalized" banks)Funding reflects banks' cost of raising senior unsecured debt (median of comparables)Beta of 0.82 (median of peers cost of equity of 8.4%)Terminal value book multiple of 1.2x <p><u>Valuation as REIT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">Funding reflects REIT's average cost of funding (median of comparables)10.0% required capitalBeta of 0.62 (median of peers cost of equity of 7.4%)Terminal value book multiple of 1.2x

Phineas cost of equity without charter

Phineas' Portfolio peers				Phineas' Single Family peers			
Ticker	Name	Beta ¹	Cost of equity ²	Ticker	Name	Beta ¹	Cost of equity ²
Residential MBS REITs				Financial Guarantors			
RWT	Redwood Trust Inc.	0.62	7.4%	MBI	MBIA Inc.	1.08	9.7%
NLY	Annaly Mortgage Mgmt Inc.	0.55	7.1	ABK	Ambac Financial Group	0.96	9.1
ANH	Anworth Mtg Asset Corp.	0.68	7.7	AGO	Assured Guaranty Ltd.	1.08	9.7
LUM	Luminent Mortgage Capital	1.00	9.3	Mortgage Insurers			
MFA	MFA Mortgage Investments Inc.	0.59	7.3	MTG	MGIC Investment Corp.	1.06	9.7%
Commercial MBS REITs				PMI	PMI Group Inc.	0.95	9.1
NCT	Newcastle Investment Corp.	0.57	7.2%	RDN	Radian Group Inc.	1.09	9.7
AHR	Anthraccite Capital Inc.	0.60	7.3	Median Single Family			
CT	Capital Trust Inc.	0.66	7.6			1.07	9.7%
Median Portfolio - REIT		0.62	7.4%	Phineas' Multi Family peers			
Thriffs				Ticker	Name	Beta ¹	Cost of equity ²
GDW	Golden West Financial Corp.	0.63	7.4%	Financial Guarantors			
WM	Washington Mutual Inc.	0.75	8.1	MBI	MBIA Inc.	1.08	9.7%
Banks with Mortgage Platforms				ABK	Ambac Financial Group	0.96	9.1
WFC	Wells Fargo & Co.	0.77	8.2%	AGO	Assured Guaranty Ltd.	1.08	9.7
BAC	Bank Of America Corp.	0.94	9.0	Multi-Family Banks			
NCC	National City Corp.	0.86	8.6	NYB	New York Community Bancorp Inc.	0.81	8.4%
NFB	North Fork Bancorporation	0.88	8.7	ICBC	Independence Community Bank Corp.	0.76	8.1
Median Portfolio - Bank		0.82	8.4%	Thriffs			
Median Portfolio		0.68	7.7%	WM	Washington Mutual Inc.	0.75	8.1
				Median Multi Family		0.89	8.8%

Without the charter, we have assumed that Phineas' business will consist of 38% portfolio, 54% single-family business and 8% multi-family business and the company's blended cost of equity would be: $38\% \times 8.4\% + 54\% \times 9.7\% + 8\% \times 8.8\% = 9.1\%$

Phineas SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Low cost of funds relative to market: perceived enhanced GSE-based credit compared to traditional AAA rating ◆ Unlimited access to credit markets ◆ Lower capital requirements (both regulatory and risk-based) ◆ High liquidity of securities ◆ Leading risk management expertise and infrastructure ◆ Strong relationships with originators and mortgage investors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Volatile GAAP accounting for portfolio → Investors will continue to ascribe low valuation to a volatile business ◆ Implicit mandate to be in all markets at all times ◆ Costs associated with meeting mission goals ◆ Limitations on products that can be wrapped in the guaranty business ◆ Constrained business opportunities and restrained risk profile
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Expand guaranty business into Alt-A and Sub-prime ◆ Take advantage of new business opportunities such as mortgage insurance and risk analytics ◆ Develop direct relationships with mortgage brokers ◆ Manage first loss position ◆ Increase duration risk opportunistically ◆ Manage non-mortgage securities through expertise in managing interest rate risk 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Investors may continue to focus on accounting returns rather than total economic returns ◆ Tight MBS OAS diminishes Phineas' funding margin; and even tighter OAS is a threat ◆ Basel II may increase financial institutions demand for mortgage assets ◆ Significant demand from U.S. depositories, REITs, hedge funds, etc. for mortgage assets ◆ Mission costs continue to escalate

Whole company competitor comparison

(\$ in millions)	Phineas	FRE	Mortgage Banks	Mortgage Insurers	Financial Guarantors	Thriffs
Price / 2006E	8.3x	9.4x	8.7x	8.6x	10.1x	11.3x
LT EPS Growth	10.0%	9.5%	12.0%	12.0%	13.0%	11.3%
On-Balance Sheet Assets	\$1,004,000	\$795,284	\$128,496	\$6,381	\$18,585	\$207,403
Off-Balance Sheet Assets (a)	\$1,311,668	852,270	NM	\$30,601	\$757,037	NM
Total Common Equity (b)	\$26,392	\$26,807	\$10,310	\$3,689	\$5,024	\$14,250
Net Income	\$7,804	\$2,937	\$2,198	\$519	\$725	\$2,079
ROAA (c)	0.8% / 0.3%	0.4% / 0.2%	1.9%	8.1% / 1.4%	3.9% / 0.1%	1.1%
ROACE	35.0%	10.1%	23.9%	13.9%	12.7%	15.7%
Capital Measures						
Tangible Common Ratio	2.6%	3.3%	8.0%	NM	NM	5.9%
Equity / Assets	3.5%	3.9%	8.0%	NM	NM	6.9%
Equity / Risk in Force Assets	1.6%	1.8%	NM	12.1%	0.7%	NM

Source: Company financials, IDD and Powerdata. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

As of December 31, 2004. Phineas data based on management estimates. Data for peer groups represent medians for each respective peer group.


Mortgage Banks refer to Countrywide Financial Corp. (CFC); Mortgage Insurers include MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and PMI Group Inc. (PMI); Financial Guarantors include MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABK) and Assured Guaranty Limited (AGO); Thriffs include Washington Mutual Inc. (WM) and Golden West Financial (GDW).

(a) Off-Balance Assets: For Phineas and FRE measured as total book of business held by 3rd party investors; for mortgage insurers and financial guarantors measured as total risk-in-force assets.

(b) Equity for Phineas as of 12/31/04 provided by management less preferred equity of \$9.1 billion.

(c) Returns measured against on-balance sheet assets (1st number) and total managed assets for Phineas, Freddie Mac, mortgage insurers and financial guarantors (2nd number).

Whole company valuation summary



N.B. Ranges for comparable public company valuations based on 5% variance from valuation using median P/2006E multiple. Segment valuation without charter based on Citigroup discounted cash flow projections for segment.

(a) Based on IBES estimates as of July 11, 2005.

(b) Equity as of 12/31/04 provided by management, adjusted for preferred equity.

(c) Companies include MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN), and FMI Group Inc. (FMI).

(d) Companies include Golden West Financial Corp. (GDW) and Washington Mutual Inc. (WM).

(e) Based on regression analysis of price-to-book versus ROE for peer group.


(f) DCF based on 7.7% cost of equity and IBES median net income. Income grows at 5.0% in 2007-2009.

(g) Based on management projections for Single- and Multifamily businesses. Citigroup projections model driven by management assumptions for the Portfolio business.

(h) Discounted current IBES median price target of \$79.00 per share over one year at Phineas' cost of equity.

(i) Fair value of existing book of business is approximately \$32 billion.

Current Phineas sum-of-the-parts DCF valuation



Single Family Valuation

Single family SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Liquidity of TBA securities ❖ Exceptional size and scale ❖ Relationships with originators ❖ Capital advantages ❖ Best execution for 15/30 year fixed rate mortgages ❖ Process exemptions (ie. SEC and rating agency fees) ❖ Depth of database covering mortgage loans 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Costs associated with meeting mission goals ❖ Constrained business opportunities ❖ Implicit restraint on risk profile ❖ Limitations on products that can be wrapped
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Expand into Alt-A and Sub-prime sectors ❖ Manage first loss position; establish mortgage insurance division ❖ Utilize alternative transaction structures (i.e. synthetic transactions) ❖ Develop direct relationships with mortgage brokers ❖ Create JV with mortgage originator to gain more control of origination process ❖ Set up a conduit; purchase loans directly and issue proprietary MBS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Consolidation of top originators ❖ Inaccurate perception of credit risk ❖ Growth of private label market ❖ Increased volume of ARM originations ❖ Increased volume of Alt-A and sub-prime originations ❖ Increased volume of affordability products ❖ New legislation may make meeting housing goals tougher and reduce capital advantage

Single family competitor comparison

(\$ in millions)	Phineas Single Family	Financial Guarantors	Mortgage Insurers
Price / 2006E	NM	10.1x	8.6x
LT EPS Growth	NM	13.0%	12.0%
Total Book of Business (a)	\$2,042,000	\$757,037	\$30,601
Total Common Equity (b)	\$11,946	\$5,024	\$3,689
Net Income	\$3,338	\$725	\$519
% Revenue from Guaranty Business	82.8%	54.0%	79.4%
Return on Avg. Book of Business	0.2%	0.1%	1.6%
ROACE	28.0%	12.7%	13.9%
Capital Measures			
Equity/ Risk in Force Assets	0.6%	0.7%	12.1%

Source: Company financials, IDD and Powerdata. Market data as of July 11, 2005.


As of December 31, 2004. Phineas data based on management estimates. Data for financial guarantors and mortgage insurers represent medians for selected peer group.

Mortgage Insurers includes MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and PMI Group Inc. (PMI); Financial Guarantors include MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABK) and Assured Guaranty Limited (AGO).

(a) For Phineas and FRE measured as total book of business; for mortgage insurers and financial guarantors measured as total risk-in-force assets.

(b) Measured as required capital based upon management estimates.

Single family valuation summary



		Valuation Per Share				
		\$15.00	\$20.00	\$25.00	\$30.00	\$35.00
		Implied Valuation Multiples				
(\$ in millions, except per share data)						
Equity Valuation Multiples						
2005 Net Income (a)	\$2,806	5.2x	6.9x	8.6x	10.3x	12.1x
2006 Net Income (a)	2,934	4.9	6.6	8.2	9.9	11.5
Current Required Capital (a)	11,946	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.8
2006 Required Capital (a)	12,285	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.8

N.B. Ranges for comparable public company valuations based on 5% variance from valuation using median P/2006E multiple. Segment valuation without charter based on Citigroup discounted cash flow projections for segment.

(a) Based on management projections.

(b) Companies include MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group (ABK) and Assured Guaranty Ltd. (AGO).

(c) Companies include MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG), Radian Group Inc. (RDN) and PMI Group Inc. (PMI).

(d) Based on regression analysis of price-to-book versus ROE for peer group.

(e) DCF based on company projections. Assumes 7.7% cost of equity, 9.0x terminal multiple in the current configuration.

Multi Family Valuation

Multi family SWOT analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Contributes substantially more to meeting housing goals than single family ❖ Outstanding relationships with DUS lenders ❖ Market leading position ❖ Depth of database covering mortgage loans ❖ Credit risk management capabilities ❖ Exceptional size and scale ❖ Process exemptions (i.e SEC and Rating agency fees) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Costs associated with meeting mission goals ❖ Increasing contribution to housing goals ❖ Long origination cycle times ❖ Implicit restraint on risk profile ❖ Constrained business opportunities
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Expansion into small balance commercial loans ❖ Lead standardization of market / products ❖ Develop direct relationships with mortgage brokers ❖ Create JV with mortgage originator to gain more control of origination process ❖ Set up a conduit; purchase loans directly and issue proprietary MBS ❖ Increase risk taking capacity; new products / programs ❖ Manage first loss position 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Condominium price increases may dissipate if condominiums purchased are returned to the rental market ❖ Multi family delinquencies have been rising while other property types have either declined or remained stable ❖ Consolidation of top originators ❖ Inaccurate perception of credit risk ❖ Growth of CMBS securitization markets ❖ New legislation may make meeting housing goals tougher and reduce capital advantage ❖ Increased pressure from Freddie Mac ❖ Growth in conduit market share, tighter pricing

Multi family competitor comparison

(\$ in millions)	Phineas Multi-Family	Financial Guarantors	Multi-Family Banks & Thrifts
Price / 2006E	NM	10.1x	12.0x
LT EPS Growth	NM	13.0%	10.0%
Total Book of Business (a)	\$110,023	\$757,037	\$20,399
Total Common Equity (b)	\$644	\$5,024	\$3,186
Net Income	\$260	\$725	\$355
% Revenue from Guaranty Business	95.4%	54.0%	NM
Return on Avg. Book of Business	0.3%	0.1%	NM
ROACE	43.2%	12.7%	12.1%
Capital Measures			
Equity/ Risk in Force Assets	0.6%	0.7%	NM
Tangible Equity/ Tangible Assets	NM	NM	5.2%

Source: Company financials, IDD and Powerdata. Market data as of July 11, 2005.


As of December 31, 2004. Phineas data for based on management estimates. Data for financial guarantors and mortgage insurers represent medians for selected peer group.

Financial Guarantors include MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group Inc. (ABK) and Assured Guaranty Limited (AGO); Multi-Family Banks and Thrifts include Washington Mutual Inc. (WM), New York Community Bancorp (NYB) and Independence Community Bank Corp. (ICBC).


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(a) For Phineas measured as total book of business; for financial guarantors measured as total risk-in-force assets; for multi-family banks and thrifts measured as total on-balance sheet assets.

(b) Measured as required capital based upon management estimates.



Multi family valuation summary



		Segment Valuation without Charter							
		\$0.50	\$1.00	\$1.50	\$2.00	\$2.50	\$3.00	\$3.50	\$4.00
		Implied Valuation Multiples							
		Price/Share							
Equity Valuation Multiples									
2005 Net Income (a)	\$255	1.9x	3.8x	5.7x	7.6x	9.5x	11.4x	13.3x	15.2x
2006 Net Income (a)	277	1.8	3.5	5.3	7.0	8.8	10.5	12.3	14.0
Current Required Capital (a)	644	0.8	1.5	2.3	3.0	3.8	4.5	5.3	6.0
2006 Required Capital (a)	749	0.6	1.3	1.9	2.6	3.2	3.9	4.5	5.2

N.B. Ranges for comparable public company valuations based on 5% variance from valuation using median P/2006E multiple. Segment valuation without charter based on Citigroup discounted cash flow projections for segment.

(a) Based on management projections.

(b) Companies include MBIA Inc. (MBI), Ambac Financial Group (ABK) and Assured Guaranty (AGO).

(c) Companies include Washington Mutual Inc. (WM), New York Community Bancorp (NYB), Independence Community Bank Corp. (ICBC).

(d) Based on regression analysis of price-to-book versus ROE for peer group.

(e) DCF based on company projections.

(f) DCF based on Citigroup adjusted company projections.

Portfolio Valuation

Portfolio SWOT analysis

Strengths

- ◆ Lower capital requirements (both regulatory and risk-based)
- ◆ Unlimited access to credit markets
- ◆ Low cost of funds relative to market: perceived enhanced GSE-based credit compared to traditional AAA rating
- ◆ Risk management expertise, experience and infrastructure

Weaknesses

- ◆ GAAP returns are volatile
- ◆ Investors will continue to ascribe lower valuations to volatile earnings
- ◆ Temptation to be in all markets at all times to facilitate earnings growth (though this is currently being challenged)

Opportunities

- ◆ Phineas' size allows it to benefit from the ability to opportunistically acquire, and selectively retain assets
- ◆ Phineas assumes duration risk more opportunistically
- ◆ Increased efficiency of derivatives markets means there is an opportunity for Phineas to optimize their match funding via enhanced option-based hedges
- ◆ Core embedded advantage in managing interest risk allows Phineas to potentially manage non-mortgage related portfolios

Threats

- ◆ Investors may continue to focus on accounting earnings rather than total economic returns; persistence of GAAP volatility may erode long-term value
- ◆ Increasing appetite of U.S. depositories (facilitated by Basel II) and hedge funds for mortgage assets
- ◆ Tight MBS OAS has diminished Phineas' funding margin, and continued OAS tightening will increase pressure on returns

Portfolio competitor comparison

(\$ in millions)	Phineas Portfolio	Residential RMBS REITs	Commercial CMBS REITs	Banks with Mortgage Platform	Thriffs	Fixed Income Asset Managers
Price / 2006E	NM	8.3x	9.9x	11.1x	11.3x	16.9x
LT EPS Growth	NM	5.0%	8.0%	9.9%	11.3%	11.0%
Total Assets	\$904,555	\$7,319	\$3,729	\$283,564	\$207,403	\$636,481 (a)
Total Common Equity	\$10,453	\$637	\$458	\$25,340	\$14,250	\$585
Net Income	\$3,131	\$78	\$43	\$4,896	\$2,079	\$156
ROAA	0.3%	1.3%	2.3%	1.7%	1.1%	15.8%
ROACE	25.0%	14.7%	11.6%	18.2%	15.7%	29.4%
Capital Measures						
Tangible Common Ratio	NM	14.7%	24.3%	5.8%	5.9%	NM
Equity / Assets	2.7%	8.3%	16.2%	9.1%	6.8%	NM


Source: Company financials, IDD and Powerdata. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

As of December 31, 2004. Phineas data on management estimates. Data for Residential RMBS REITs, Commercial CMBS REITs, Banks, Thrifts, and Asset Managers represent medians for selected peer group.

REIT: RMBS includes Annaly Mortgage Management (NLY), Redwood Trust Inc. (RWT), MFA Mortgage Investments Inc. (MFA), Anworth Mortgage Asset Corp. (ANH), and Luminant Mortgage Capital Inc. (LUM); REIT: CMBS includes Newcastle Investment Corp. (NCT), Anthracite Capital Inc. (AHR) and Capital Trust Inc. (CT); Banks w/ Mortgage Platform include Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC), National City Corp. (NCC) and North Fork Bancorp. (NFB); Thrifts include Washington Mutual Inc. (WM) and Golden West Financial (GDW); Fixed Income Asset Managers include BlackRock Inc. (BLK), Nuveen Investments (JNC) and Federated Investors Inc. (FIL).

(a) Reflects assets under management (AUM).

Portfolio valuation summary



N.B. Ranges for comparable public company valuations based on 5% variance from valuation using median P/2006E multiple. Segment valuation without charter based on Citigroup discounted cash flow projections for segment.

(a) Based on Citigroup regression analysis of price-to-book versus ROE for peer group.

(b) Assumes median dividend yield of 11.2% and a range of +/- 5%.

(c) Based on management projections.

(d) Based on management projections assuming portfolio run-off. Private company projections adjusted by Citigroup.

Alternative Approaches To Charter Valuation

Overview of the valuation of the charter

Value Per Share

Methodology	Current Configuration	Without Charter (a)	Implied Charter Value	W/out Charter (Diluted) (c)	Implied Charter Value (Diluted)
Sum-of-the-parts DCF Valuation					
Single Family	\$32.23	\$19.21	\$13.01	\$18.25	\$13.97
Multi-Family	2.97	2.80	0.17	2.66	\$0.31
Portfolio	27.44	13.51	13.93	12.83	\$14.61
Total	\$62.63	\$35.52	\$27.11	\$33.74	\$28.89
Whole Company DCF (b)	\$79.41	\$35.52	\$43.89	\$33.74	\$45.67
Franchise Factor Model			\$19.72		
Event studies of restatement, late filing and SEC investigation			\$5.46		

Note: Valuations based on 967.904 million shares outstanding and median of respective valuation range.

(a) Based on management estimates and Citigroup assumptions. Reflects higher capital requirements, representative growth rates or portfolio size, and representative cost of funds as a non-GSE company.

(b) Whole company projections based on IBES estimates. Implied charter value is calculated by subtracting the valuation of the company without the charter.

(c) Assumes 50.852 million common shares are issued at market price to meet the additional capital requirement as a bank (5% tangible equity ratio).

Tipping point scenarios: Impact on Phineas growth & profitability

	Description	Impact (Management Projections)				
Status quo	<ul style="list-style-type: none">No material changes to current capital requirements2.67% capital requirement	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	24.7%	25.8%	25.8%	25.1%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	73.3%	90.2%	81.7%	94.1%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	10.6%	9.2%	3.6%	0.7%
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$80,621	—	—	\$62.63
Bank capital requirement	<ul style="list-style-type: none">5% total capital requirement for the portfolioNo portfolio reductionAssumes 232mm common shares are issued at market price	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	19.9%	16.7%	16.9%	16.7%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	(183.9%)	91.0%	83.1%	94.6%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	(3.2%)	8.7%	3.4%	0.7%
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	Impact / Share
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$59,054	(\$1,566)	\$13,714	\$49.21 (\$13.42)
"Economic" capital requirement	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Portfolio capitalized using median capital levels of largest financial institutions6.9% total capital requirement^(e)490mm common shares issued at market price	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	17.5%	13.4%	13.6%	13.5%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	(364.5%)	91.5%	84.0%	94.9%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	(15.2%)	8.3%	3.4%	0.8%
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	Impact / Share
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$58,547	(\$2,074)	\$28,918	\$40.17 (\$22.46)
Portfolio runoff	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Existing portfolio assets are run-off (no new business)No change in capital requirements	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	25.7%	27.9%	29.0%	29.1%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	153.7%	145.9%	114.4%	122.9%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	(13.8%)	(4.9%)	(4.6%)	(5.1%)
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	Impact / Share
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$47,966	(\$12,855)	—	\$48.56 (\$13.07)
5bp user fee	<ul style="list-style-type: none">5bps after-tax user fee imposed on the total book of business	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	20.7%	21.8%	21.8%	21.2%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	68.1%	88.5%	78.5%	93.0%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	(7.3%)	10.3%	3.6%	0.2%
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	Impact / Share
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$48,200	(\$12,420)	—	\$49.80 (\$12.83)
Break-even user fee	<ul style="list-style-type: none">11bps after-tax user fee imposed on the total book of businessReduces value of charter to zero	2006	2007	2008	2009	
		After-Tax ROACE (a)	15.7%	16.9%	16.9%	16.3%
		Dividend Payout Ratio (b)	57.9%	85.1%	72.2%	90.9%
		YOY EPS Growth (Fully Diluted)	(29.7%)	12.5%	3.7%	(0.7%)
		Total	Change in Value	Capital Raised ^(c)	NPV / Share ^(d)	Impact / Share
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$32,659	(\$27,961)	—	\$33.74 (\$28.89)


Overview of alternative charter valuation approaches

- Our proprietary credit rating model suggests that without the implicit government guarantee Phineas' S&P rating would be downgraded from AAA to A
- This is broadly consistent with some preliminary S&P comments on the downgrade of WestLB, a somewhat comparable case in Europe
- Assuming the loss of the implicit government guarantee, Phineas would have to issue \$18bn new common equity to improve its credit rating by 1 notch
- The loss of the implicit government guarantee will also have potentially an impact on the cost of equity. Our estimates suggest that Phineas costs of equity would change from 7.7% to 9.1%
- Taken together, the reduction in ROE and the increase in cost of capital yield a reduction in P/E by 2.6x which implies a reduction in value by \$17.8 billion. This would be an estimate of the value of the implicit government guarantee
- Our model also suggests that the market currently perceives a negative earnings growth rate for Phineas going forward (assuming no charter change), in stark contrast to the positive growth predicted 5 years ago. Similar growth estimates are also observed for firms in the mortgage sector
- The value of the implicit government guarantee is also shown to be present when we evaluate the response of Phineas stock price to negative announcements such as delay in filing, restatements, and SEC investigations which occurred during the last two years. In all cases, Phineas' stock dropped significantly less than companies that experienced similar events but had no government guarantees

Phineas: Implied credit rating


- ▶ The combination of size, the ratio of tangible equity to tangible assets and core return on assets explains about 85% of the ratings variation in the peer group
- ▶ We built two models using a different measure for size: tangible common equity and total assets. We used Phineas' financial metrics as of FYE2004 provided by management; for the peers we used the most recent financial data
- ▶ Provided that in a post charter period Phineas is rated by S&P as a mortgage issuer/bank, we find that its implied S&P credit rating would be A

Proprietary Credit Rating Model using Total Assets as a size metric



$$\text{Credit Rating} = -12.95 + 2.55 \times \text{Log (Total Assets (\$000))} + 0.62 \times \text{Tangible Equity / Tangible Assets (\%)} + 0.86 \times \text{Core Return on Assets (\%)}$$

Proprietary Credit Rating Model using Tangible Common Equity as a size metric




$$\text{Credit Rating} = -8.66 + 2.54 \times \text{Log (Tangible Common Equity (\$000))} + 0.46 \times \text{Tangible Equity / Tangible Assets (\%)} + 0.79 \times \text{Core Return on Assets (\%)}$$

Phineas: Credit impact

- ▶ We estimate that Phineas would have to issue \$18bn of common equity to increase its A S&P credit rating by one notch to an A+
- ▶ Alternatively if Phineas were to reduce its total assets to approximately \$560bn, we estimate that the Company would get a one notch upgrade to an A+ S&P rating

Proprietary Credit Rating Model using Total Assets as a size metric



Required Common and Preferred Equity Issuance as a function of targeted credit rating


Total Assets (\$bn)	Targeted Post Charter S&P Credit Rating						
	AAA	AA+	AA	AA-	A+	A	A-
1,004	82	66	50	34	18	2	(14)
904	72	58	43	29	14	(0)	(15)
803	62	49	36	23	10	(2)	(15)
703	51	40	29	18	6	(5)	(16)
602	41	31	21	12	2	(8)	(17)
502	29	21	13	5	(3)	(11)	(19)

Note: the above numbers do not take into account any proceeds Phineas might get from selling some of its assets

Note: Data used for Phineas as of 12/31/04 (provided by management): Tangible GAAP Equity = \$35.5bn, Total Assets = \$1,004bn

A. Franchise Factor Model

Post charter value impact: ROE & COE



- (1): Growth: we use Phineas median implied growth for the 1998-2004 period.
 (2): We assumed a risk free rate of 4.34% and an equity market risk premium of 5%.
 (3): ROE: 3 – year average ROE as of June 2004 (pre-restatement)
 (4): NTM EPS estimate: \$6.95 per share, number of shares outstanding: 968mm.

B. Event Studies

Estimate of the value savings due to implied government guarantee

- ▶ We estimate the stock price reaction of Phineas and a sample of comparable firms for 3 particular events (delay in filing, restatement of financials, inquiry by SEC) that occurred during the last year for both Phineas and the benchmark firms
- ▶ Out of a sample of 88 companies, which delayed filing, 8 companies had been delisted, 47 companies delayed filings with SEC, 24 restated their financial statements and 20 were investigated.^(a)
- ▶ The event study methodology employed suggests that for all three events the stock price reaction of Phineas was less negative than the average of the benchmark firms, implying that there were value savings for Phineas presumably due to the implied guarantee
- ▶ In total, for all three events combined, Phineas' stock price reaction over the 2 days around the announcement averages -5.62% versus -15.02% for the benchmark firms
- ▶ The total dollar value savings for Phineas (based on today's equity market value) for the above three events is \$5.28 billion, or \$5.46 per share

(a) Companies included the top third of the comparables ranked by total assets:

Delay in Filing: Veritas Software (VRTS), Navistar International (NAV), United Rentals (URI), Saks (SKS), DPL (DPL), BJ Services (BJS), King Pharmaceuticals (KG), UTStarcom (UTSI), Interpublic (IPG), Healthcare Realty Trust (HR), Nortel Networks (NT), Key Energy Services (KEGS), OM Group (OMG), Bally Total Fitness (BFT), Cardinal Health (CAH), Financial Industries (FNIN), Offshore Logistics (OLG), Krispy Kreme (KKD), Integrated Electrical Services (IES), Asyst Technologies (ASYT), Sourcecorp. (SRCP), MDC Partners (MDCAE)

Restatement: VRTS, NAV, URI, DPL, UTSI, IPG, MBIA (MBI), NT, OMG, BFT, KKD, ASYT, SRCP


Investigation: URI, SKS, KG, OMG, BFT, CAH, KKD, IES, SRCP

Stock price response to delay in filings

- The market's reaction to delay in filings announcements averages -4.15% over the 2 days before and after the announcement, while for Phineas it averages -2.45% . The difference of 1.70% is an estimate of the value savings in this particular event of the implied government guarantee


Cumulative excess returns around the announcement of delay in filings

Benchmark firms



Cumulative return of -4.15% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Phineas




Cumulative return of -2.45% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Stock price response to restatement of financials

- The market's reaction to restatement of financials announcements averages -4.2% over the 2 days before and after the announcement, while for Phineas it averages -0.98% . The difference of 3.21% is an estimate of the value savings in this particular event of the implied government guarantee


Cumulative excess returns of around the announcement of restatement

Benchmark firms



Cumulative return of -4.2% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Phineas




Cumulative return of -0.98% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Stock price response to inquiry

- The market's reaction of benchmark sample firms to inquiry announcements averages -6.67% over the 2 days before and after the announcement, while for Phineas it averages -2.19% . The difference of 4.48% is an estimate of the value savings in this particular event of the implied government guarantee


Cumulative excess returns of around the announcement of inquiry

Benchmark firms



Cumulative return of -6.67% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Phineas



Cumulative return of -2.19% from t-2 days to t+2 days

Today's discussion

- Presentation Overview and Summary Recommendations
- Mortgage Market Trends
- Monoline Lifecycles
- Primeas Valuation
- **Citigroup Recommendations**

Citigroup recommendations

Recommendation	Comments	Potential valuation expansion
<u>Optimize value of Portfolio business</u>		
1) Manage growth in portfolio to optimize returns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Manage business to total returns on invested capital and not EPS growth ❖ Optimize investor interest by isolating the Portfolio's value and returns for investors that place the highest value on the resulting economic earnings stream ❖ Target investors who understand the portfolio business and are comfortable with volatile GAAP results 	
2) Structural alternative → Portfolio tracking stock		
<u>New business opportunities</u>		
1) Extension of the Guaranty business into new products	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Utilize existing core competency in evaluating mortgage credit risk to expand the guaranty business into non-traditional products (Jumbo^(a), Alt-A, Sub-prime, HELOCs) ❖ Non-traditional markets have recently experienced significant growth. Expansion into these products should provide Phineas with more diversified sources of revenue and higher earnings growth 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ ~ \$6 billion / \$5.72 per share
2) Asset management & risk analytics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Profit from selling market-leading portfolio management skills to institutional investors including banks, REITs, pension funds, insurance companies, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ ~ \$2 billion / \$2.31 per share
3) Mortgage insurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Leverage existing relationships with mortgage originators and leading understanding of mortgage credit risk to expand into mortgage insurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ ~ \$3 billion / \$3.07 per share
<u>Consider comprehensive investor relations program</u>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❖ Use a variety of descriptive and quantitative tools to highlight how the businesses are managed to shareholder maximize value ❖ Focus on reinvigorating existing and new investors, and to reconciling GAAP results with management of the business and "core" results 	

(a) Expanding the guaranty business into Jumbos would require an amendment to the charter.

Summary impact of business initiatives

	Description	Impact					
Status quo	❖ No additional business initiatives ❖ No additional equity requirement	2006	2007	2008	2009		
		After-Tax ROACE	24.7%	25.8%	25.8%	25.1%	
		Dividend Payout Ratio (a)	73.3%	90.2%	81.7%	94.1%	
		YOY EPS Growth	10.6%	9.2%	3.6%	0.7%	
		Total	Change in Value	Incremental Capital Req'd	NPV Per Share		
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$60,621	--	--	\$62.63	
Guarantee business	❖ Expansion into non-traditional mortgage guaranty business ❖ Guarantee fee of 30bp, losses of 5bp, admin expenses of 3bp ❖ Capital requirement of 59bp of book of business	2006	2007	2008	2009		
		After-Tax ROACE	24.9%	26.1%	26.4%	26.1%	
		Dividend Payout Ratio (a)	70.2%	86.2%	74.0%	84.2%	
		YOY EPS Growth	11.6%	10.8%	6.8%	4.5%	
		Total	Change in Value	Incremental Capital Req'd	NPV / Share (b)	Per share Impact	
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$66,157	\$5,536	--	\$68.35	\$5.72
Asset management	❖ Expansion into asset management and risk analytics ❖ Fees of 28bp of AuM, costs of 18bp for asset management ❖ Fees of 6bp of AuM, costs of 3bp for risk analytics ❖ No additional capital requirement ❖ Disintermediation of mortgage insurers	2006	2007	2008	2009		
		After-Tax ROACE	24.9%	26.0%	26.0%	25.5%	
		Dividend Payout Ratio (a)	73.4%	90.3%	81.9%	94.2%	
		YOY EPS Growth	11.2%	9.4%	3.8%	1.0%	
		Total	Change in Value	Incremental Capital Req'd	NPV / Share (b)	Per share Impact	
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$62,852	\$2,232	--	\$64.94	\$2.31
Mortgage insurance	❖ Guarantee fee of 70bp, losses of 30bp, admin expenses of 3bp ❖ Capital requirement of 59bp of book of business	2006	2007	2008	2009		
		After-Tax ROACE	24.9%	26.1%	26.3%	26.0%	
		Dividend Payout Ratio (a)	71.9%	88.7%	79.0%	90.7%	
		YOY EPS Growth	11.5%	10.1%	5.5%	2.8%	
		Total	Change in Value	Incremental Capital Req'd	NPV / Share (b)	Per share Impact	
		Sum-of-the-Parts Value	\$63,595	\$2,974	--	\$65.70	\$3.07

I. Optimize Value of Portfolio Business

Strategic Alternative: Alternative Management Philosophy

Assessing portfolio returns

Phineas Management Estimates

(\$ in billions)	Actual for the year ended December 31					Projected for the year ended December 31				
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Portfolio Balance (a)	\$605	\$717	\$805	\$914	\$954	\$828	\$828	\$828	\$828	\$828
Financial Leverage Assumption	2.05%	2.05%	2.05%	2.05%	2.05%	2.67%	2.67%	2.67%	2.67%	2.67%
Total Capital Required (Inc. Preferreds)	12.4	14.7	16.5	18.7	19.6	22.1	22.1	22.1	22.1	22.1
Common Equity (b)	10.1	12.4	13.8	14.6	10.5	14.3	15.7	16.0	17.0	17.0
(\$ in millions)										
Historical Total Returns										
Pretax Total Returns (c)	\$484	\$860	(\$1,126)	\$7,863	\$4,771	--	--	--	--	--
After-tax Total Returns (a)	324	571	(755)	5,122	3,131	--	--	--	--	--
Historical Core Earnings (d)										
Pretax Core Earnings (e)	\$4,235	\$5,378	\$6,517	\$6,674	\$6,489	--	--	--	--	--
After-tax Core Earnings (a)	2,745	3,489	4,215	4,358	4,230	--	--	--	--	--
Projected "Core Earnings"										
Pretax Core Earnings	--	--	--	--	--	\$4,970	\$5,589	\$6,271	\$6,456	\$6,325
After-tax Core Earnings	--	--	--	--	--	3,152	3,663	4,203	4,355	4,308
Profitability Ratios:										
Total Return On Equity (ROE) (a)	2.30%	4.00%	(5.00%)	35.20%	15.80%	--	--	--	--	--
Core Earnings / Avg. Common Equity (After-tax)	27.11%	28.15%	30.51%	29.78%	40.47%	--	--	--	--	--
Core Earnings / Avg. Common Equity (Pretax)	--	--	--	--	--	40.14%	37.26%	39.60%	39.19%	37.30%
Core Earnings / Avg. Common Equity (After-tax)	--	--	--	--	--	25.46	27.20	28.91	28.61	27.23

N.B. 2004 returns as provided by management. Management projections from 06/2005.

(a) Provided by management.

(b) Assumes callable preferred equity is called at earliest call date.

(c) Calculated based on pre-tax ROAA of 0.08%, 0.12%, (0.14%), 0.86% and 0.50% in 2000 - 2004, respectively, provided by management.

(d) Pre-restatement.

(e) Calculated based on pre-tax ROAA of 0.70%, 0.75%, 0.81%, 0.73% and 0.68% in 2000 - 2004, respectively, provided by management.

Portfolio Comparable Companies						
Institutions	LT Issuer Credit Rating		Equity/ Assets	10 Yr Median ROACE		Total Annualized Return Since 1/1/2000 (a)
	S&P	Moody's		Pre-Tax	After Tax	
REIT: RMBS Portfolio Managers	NR	NR	8.5%	14.3%	14.3%	28.1%
REIT: CMBS Portfolio Managers	NR	NR	16.2	13.6	13.6	22.2
Banks with Mortgage Platform	A+	Aa3	9.1	30.0	19.0	13.8
Thriffs	A	A2	6.9	27.9	17.5	24.9
Fixed Income Asset Manager	NR	NR	NA	47.8	29.2	26.2

Source: IDD, SNL Datasource. Based on company filings as on 12.31.2004 and market data as on 07.11.2005.


N.B. REIT: RMBS Portfolio Managers data since 1999, REIT: CMBS Portfolio Managers data since 2000 and Fixed Income Asset Managers since 1997.

(a) Reflects share price appreciation plus reinvested dividends.

Alternative portfolio management strategy

- ◆ We used a regression analysis of Phineas' monthly purchase data from January 1998 to early 2005 to attempt to measure the statistical correlation of portfolio activity and movements in the option-adjusted spreads (OASs) of Phineas current coupon MBSs
 - We believe that in times of market stress Phineas can achieve its mission and its shareholder return goals by being an active buyer of mortgages; Phineas can be far more selective in normal markets
 - Throughout this period there seems to have been little correlation between portfolio activity and OAS spreads. However, we also observe that in certain periods of high market volatility an increase in Phineas portfolio has been followed by a tightening of spreads
- ◆ Market participants believe, however, that Phineas will be an active participant in the mortgage market in times of market stress, likely stabilizing market spreads
- ◆ As a result we recommend that Phineas only pursues trades that fulfill its cost of equity requirement of 7.7%. Phineas may also consider reducing its derivatives activity, which would reduce mark-to-market accounting adjustments and would lead to more transparent GAAP earnings. While a reduction in synthetic trades may reduce economic returns, investors may value a more transparent and predictable earnings stream with a higher multiple
- ◆ Selling into a Phineas MBS is easily the best alternative for lenders when there is a TBA market. Currently, Phineas includes non-prime loans (low FICOs, investor properties, alt documentation, etc) into its standard pools. We recommend that Phineas segregate such loans, and create TBA markets for investor loans, for low FICO loans, etc. This will provide an incentive for lenders to sell such pools into Phineas pools
- ◆ Phineas should lobby to have the designation of high cost areas updated regularly (as in the recent proposed House legislation), so that average size loans in places like CA (which accounts for a quarter of U.S. mortgage originations) are not excluded from Phineas pools

GSEs have positively impacted the mortgage market





- ◆ The wide fluctuations in mortgage spreads during periods of stress in the 1980s have been largely absent since the early 1990s. The widening during the hedge fund crisis in 1998 was much smaller, and has been largely reversed, despite huge refinancing waves from 2001 to 2004
- ◆ The prepayment option has become much more efficient during the last 20 years, which implies that nominal mortgage spreads should have widened (assuming that investors demand a constant OAS). The absence of such a widening could be explained through the presence of GSE activity

Limitations on analytical framework



- ◆ There are significant data limitations in connection with our analysis:
 1. We have only monthly purchase data, whereas OASs change constantly;
 2. There are variable and unpredictable lags between purchase decisions (when the market would react) and reported purchases
- ◆ An absence of statistical correlation does not imply an absence of a relationship between two variables. The relationship could be complicated and non-linear, and perhaps present only at certain times (such as the stressed markets of late 1998 and mid-2003)
- ◆ The data is from a period when there was already a substantial retained portfolio – we cannot extrapolate to a situation with no retained portfolio
- ◆ The perception of the GSEs as opportunistic buyers likely has a psychological impact on MBS investors

We could find no statistical correlation between Phineas portfolio activity and OAS changes



- ◆ Our analysis uses two measures of portfolio activity: the *% change in the portfolio size* (top graph), and the *ratio of purchases to issuance* during a month (bottom graph)
- ◆ The lag refers to the assumed time between the decision to buy MBS and the transaction being reported as a purchase
- ◆ The results are similar for varying lag periods


Analysis for just 1998 also shows no overall correlation, but Phineas purchase activity in the Q4 may have tempered OAS widening



- ◆ Analysis of just 1998 also shows little statistical correlation overall
- ◆ However, there are indications that Phineas activity impacted OASs in late 1998: from September 98 to January 99, the portfolio grew from \$375b to \$420b, and OASs, which had spiked in the fall, tightened almost 40bps over this period
- ◆ General market perception at the time was that the GSEs' buying tempered and reversed the widening caused by the hedge fund crisis
- ◆ Spreads of other fixed income products which had widened dramatically in the 2nd and 3rd quarter, such as corporate bonds, also tightened during the 4th quarter of 1998


An analysis for 2003 similarly shows little overall correlation between portfolio activity levels and changes in current coupon OASs

Phineas MBS OAS vs % change in portfolio size




- ◆ However, there are again signs of Phineas portfolio impact on OASs during a brief period of heavy growth: between July and September 2003, the portfolio increased from \$838 billion to \$917 billion, while OASs declined by about 20bps from August to October 2003


Phineas MBS OAS vs purchases/ issuance



It is difficult to discern any relationship between relative current coupon OASs and portfolio growth rates




- ◆ Phineas MBSs did become more attractive to investors during the first half of the 1990s, but portfolio growth rates were similar
- ◆ The relationship between Phineas and Freddie Mac current coupon OASs has been relatively stable since then



Structural Alternative: Tracking Stock

Structural alternative: Tracking stock

Tracking stock structure




Note: 2004 financial data.

Benefits

- ❖ Potentially enhances Phineas' valuation as investors may more accurately value Phineas' portfolio business
- ❖ Maintains tax, legal and credit consolidation
- ❖ Retains Phineas' control and permits synergies within the group
- ❖ Enhances employee incentives by aligning compensation to the performance of the portfolio business
- ❖ Results in tax savings versus the sale of subsidiary stock
- ❖ Can be used as acquisition currency

Hypothetical Phineas tracking stock performance



Considerations

- ❖ Requires shareholder approval
- ❖ Adds complexity to capital structure and financial statements
- ❖ May be detrimental to a full separation as assets and liabilities remain with Phineas
- ❖ Can raise difficult corporate governance issues (i.e. proper capital allocation and distribution policy); heightens board responsibilities
- ❖ Requires significant time and resources to implement (about 6 months)

II. New Business Opportunities

Phineas' competitive advantages to expand business

	Origination / Customer Relationship / Brand / Distribution			Portfolio Management			Credit Risk			Servicing		Insurance Underwriting		Constraints?
	Direct	Branch	Wholesale	Mortgage	Interest Rate	Other	Mortgage	Bond	Other	Mortgage	Other	P&C	Title	
Credit Guarantee / Conduit														
Non-conventional Mortgage			<div></div>	<div></div>			<div></div>				<div></div>			Charter
Other Consumer			<div></div>			<div></div>			<div></div>		<div></div>			Charter
Asset Management														
Conventional Mortgage			<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>							Customer Conflict, HUD approval?
Sub-prime / Home Equity			<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>							Customer Conflict, HUD approval?
Fixed Income			<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>					HUD approval?
Mortgage Insurance			<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>							Charter, Customer Conflict
Title Insurance			<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>							<div></div>	Charter
Financial Guarantor			<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>					Charter
Mortgage Origination	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>				<div></div>							Charter
Mortgage Servicing (outsourcing)			<div></div>							<div></div>				HUD approval?
International Mortgage			<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>			<div></div>				Charter
Banking	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>			Charter
Mortgage REIT			<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>			<div></div>				Charter
Homeowner's Insurance	<div></div>	<div></div>	<div></div>		<div></div>	<div></div>						<div></div>		Charter

New products

Current Customers (Conforming/Non-Conforming Originators)

- Countrywide
- Washington Mutual
- Wells Fargo
- GMAC Mortgage (RFC)

Phineas

New Customers (Non-Conforming Originators)

- Ameriquest
- First Franklin
- New Century
- Option One

Conforming

Non-Conforming

Conventional

2004 Issuance: \$1,112b
(53%) YOY Growth
7% 5yr CAGR
80% Issuance rate^(a)

Jumbo

2004 Issuance: \$233b
(14%) YOY Growth
12% 5yr CAGR
43% Issuance Rate

Alt-A

2004 Issuance: \$159b
114% YOY Growth
68% 5yr CAGR
56% Issuance Rate

Sub-prime

2004 Issuance: \$363b
96% YOY Growth
45% 5yr CAGR
56% Issuance Rate

HELOC

2004 Issuance: \$36b
293% YOY Growth
60% 2yr CAGR
Low Issuance Rate

Opportunities

- Strong growth in the non-conforming market
- Provides ability to hedge downturn in one segment of the market
- Phineas can leverage relationships it has with current customers to tap into their non-conforming production
- Phineas has core competency in evaluating credit risk
- The formation of a liquid outlet for non-conforming loans may encourage more non-conforming originations from traditional lenders
- Success will be based on ability to compete on price versus private label markets
- Issuance rates low compared to conventional mortgages; Phineas has ability to expand its mission to non-conforming sector
- Supports mission goals

Considerations

- Increased credit risk; must charge higher fees in anticipation of higher losses
- Potential regulatory scrutiny as Phineas increases its risk profile; capital requirement may increase
- Jumbo loans not allowable under charter; participation in this segment would require regulatory approval
- Long-term strength of non-conforming market is questionable; space is crowded and margins have been shrinking
- Market competition has led to riskier products; lack of credit history limits Phineas' competitive advantage
- Most sub-prime loans are originated without mortgage insurance, so Phineas may incur significant credit enhancement fees

New products valuation assumptions

- ◆ Business is operated within the GSE charter
- ◆ Non-conforming mortgage debt outstanding grows at 15% in 2006, 10% in 2007 and 5% in 2008-2009
- ◆ Issuance rate (securitizations / originations) is 50% in 2006, 55% in 2007, 60% in 2008 and 65% in 2009
- ◆ Phineas' market share of securitized non-conforming mortgage debt outstanding is 2.5% in 2006, 5.0% in 2007, 10% in 2008 and 15% in 2009
- ◆ Guaranty fees are 30bps in 2006-2009 and losses are 5bps over same period
- ◆ Administrative expenses, which include mission costs (franchise fee assumed to be captured in mission costs), are 3bps of 2006 non-conforming book of business, based upon similar management estimates for existing book of business. Administrative costs grow at 5% per annum from 2007-2009
- ◆ Corporate overhead allocation is 3bps of 2006 non-conforming book of business, based upon similar management estimates for existing book of business. Corporate overhead expense costs grow at 5% per annum from 2007-2009
- ◆ Income on capital and related interest income are calculated using the same assumptions as used for the existing business estimates

100

DCF Analysis


Incremental Equity Value per Share	\$5.72
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(b) Capital required calculated as 58.5 basis points against the single -family book of business.

citigroup

Asset management & risk analytics: “Phineas Solutions”

- Leverage excellence in mortgage analytics and transaction execution to manage balance sheet assets of banks, insurance companies, REITs, etc.
- Utilize best-in-class proprietary investment analytics and operating systems to offer investment tools, outsourcing and advisory services to these same institutional investors
- Fees are generated as a percentage of assets under management
- May be a conflict of interest with proprietary portfolio
- Leverage strong “Brand” as mortgage analytics experts



Phineas is a compelling solution for clients

- Unmatched, disciplined investment process excellence:
 - ✦ Relative value sector/sub-sector rotation and security selection
 - ✦ Rigorous quantitative security and portfolio valuations
 - ✦ Intense fundamental credit analysis
 - ✦ Portfolio duration controlled within a narrow band around a benchmark index
 - ✦ Experienced portfolio managers
- International demand for asset management is strong and offers a tremendous growth opportunity

Risk analytics is also a thriving market

- Likely to be well received by Wall Street → has been identified as an, “... excellent play on the disintermediation of risk management by the capital markets away from banks, corporations, pension plans and insurance companies”
- Risks moving into the capital markets is driving compelling growth and timing is ideal due to flattening of yield curve → banks and other clients will likely seek assistance in transitioning their balance sheet assets
- Other participants in this space have experienced tremendous growth (e.g. BlackRock 2003 – 2004 revenue growth of 37%)
- Phineas benefits from significant economies of scale and barriers to entry

Source: Company filings and Wall Street research.

Asset and risk management assumptions

- ◆ Business is operated within the GSE charter
- ◆ No additional required capital

Asset Management

- ◆ Phineas' market share of 2006E MBS managed by institutional asset managers is 3% in 2006 and assets under management (AUM) grow at 50% per year through 2009, reaching 8% market share in 2009
- ◆ Fees are a percentage of AUM – 28bps – and are based on the median of all 2004 institutional MBS asset managers
- ◆ Operating margin of 35% is based on asset management industry

Risk Analytics

- ◆ Phineas assumed to capture 3% of relevant mortgage debt outstanding^(a) 2006
- ◆ Fair value of assets managed by Phineas Solutions grows at 40% per year in 2007 then 30% through 2009, based on industry growth rates. 2009 share of MDO is projected at 5%
- ◆ Fees are a percentage of AUM – 6 bps – based on Citigroup estimates
- ◆ Operating margin of 50% is assumed given Phineas' scale and low incremental costs to start up and operate the business

(a) Single and multi-family projected MDO, less GSE portfolio balances (which are assumed to equal current May/05 balances).

Expansion into asset and risk management creates over \$2 billion of incremental value

Assumptions				
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Rf	4.34%	
Terminal Multiple (a)	19.6x	Market Risk Premium	5.00	
Phineas Cost of Equity (b)	7.7%	Beta	0.68	
Shares	968	Tax Rate	27.0%	
Growth in FCF 2010	38.09%			
DCF Analysis				
Revenues	2006	2007	2008	2009
Pretax Income	\$55	\$79	\$106	\$145
Income Taxes	(15)	(21)	(29)	(39)
Franchise Fee	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Net Income	\$38	\$54	\$74	\$101
Capital Retention Requirement	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Free Cash Flow	\$38	\$54	\$74	\$101
Terminal Value				\$2,716
Free Cash Flow / Net Income	100%	100%	100%	100%
Incremental Equity Value				\$2,232
Incremental Equity Value Per Share				\$2.31
Terminal Value As A % Of Equity Value				105.0%


Source: Mobius; Federal Reserve.

(a) Based on BLK's P / 2006E ratio as of 07.11.2005.

(b) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

Sensitivity Analysis						
		Terminal Multiple				
		17.6x	18.6x	19.6x	20.6x	21.6x
Cost of Equity	5.7%	\$2.25	\$2.37	\$2.48	\$2.60	\$2.71
	6.7	2.17	2.28	2.39	2.50	2.61
	7.7	2.09	2.20	2.31	2.41	2.52
	8.7	2.02	2.12	2.23	2.33	2.43
	9.7	1.95	2.05	2.15	2.25	2.35

Mortgage insurance



(a) Originators will be able to sell loans directly to Phineas without using mortgage insurers as intermediaries

(b) Phineas no longer has to use mortgage insurers on loans with LTVs greater than 80%

2004 MI Market Share


Insurer	Market Share	Risk in Force
MGIC	23.2%	\$168
PMI	18.7	136
Radian	15.9	115
AIG	13.5	98
Genworth	13.5	98
Republic	10.3	75
Triad	4.8	35

Opportunities

- ❖ Ability to leverage existing relationships with mortgage originators
- ❖ Phineas can utilize core competency in evaluating mortgage credit risk
- ❖ Vertical integration allows disintermediation of mortgage insurers; elimination of third-party may reduce originator costs and lead to lower mortgage rates
- ❖ IBES analysts predict long-term growth of approx. 12%
- ❖ Historical mortgage insurer forward P/E multiples have ranged from 6.0-13.0x and are currently at 8.6x
- ❖ Attractive margins – mortgage insurer guaranty fees are approximately 70bps versus losses of 30bps

Challenging market environment

- ❖ Growth in net insurance in force has been stagnant since 2000



Considerations

- ❖ Industry growth has slowed in 2004; business is highly cyclical, tied to growth of conforming originations
- ❖ As such, entrance into mortgage insurance does not provide a hedge against Phineas' current business
- ❖ May not be allowable under charter; participation may require regulatory approval
- ❖ Increased risk profile due to first loss position may increase capital requirement
- ❖ Industry is comprised of well-established players who have maintained consistent market shares
- ❖ Growth of sub-prime market and new products (piggyback seconds) marginalizing mortgage insurers
- ❖ May endanger relationships with originators with captive re-insurers

Mortgage insurance valuation assumptions

- ◆ Business is operated within the GSE charter
- ◆ Single family mortgage debt outstanding based upon Phineas' estimates
- ◆ Mortgage insurer penetration rate is 9% 2006-2009
- ◆ Phineas' market share of insured mortgage debt outstanding is 2.5% in 2006, 5.0% in 2007, 10% in 2008 and 15% in 2009
- ◆ Guaranty fees are 70bps in 2006-2009 and losses are 30bps over the same period
- ◆ Administrative expenses, which include mission costs (franchise fee assumed to be captured in mission costs), are 3bps of 2006 mortgage insurance book of business, based upon similar management estimates for existing book of business. Administrative costs grow at 5% per annum from 2007-2009
- ◆ Corporate overhead allocation is 3bps of 2006 mortgage insurance book of business, based upon similar management estimates for existing book of business. Corporate overhead expense costs grow at 5% per annum from 2007-2009
- ◆ Income on capital and related interest income are calculated using the same assumptions as used for the existing business estimates

III. Consider Comprehensive Investor Relations Program

Phineas should seek an optimal level of disclosure

- ◆ **In light of recent accounting issues as well as inherent complexities of Phineas' business, Phineas should take the following steps to restore investor relations**
- ◆ **Quarterly earnings release statements**
 - ✦ Include discussion connecting fair value and core earnings and how management runs the business
 - ✦ Extensive discussion of changes in fair value and core earnings (include non-restated periods)
 - ✦ Define non-GAAP operating measure
- ◆ **Investor day discussion**
 - ✦ Describe mission / charter
 - ✦ Outline and describe key business lines
 - How does Phineas make money?
 - Business description
 - Steps in the process
 - What are the key risks?
 - ✦ Discuss management philosophy
 - Growth / mission
 - Risk management
 - ✦ Credit risk management
 - Underwriting guidelines
 - Collateral protection
 - Diversification
 - ✦ Interest rate risk management
 - Define risks – convexity, duration, prepayment, etc.
 - How does active management of duration gap maximize shareholder value?
 - Chart aligning key risks with primary hedge techniques (includes resecuritization), including summary description of payout in various interest rate scenarios
 - Define duration gap

Phineas should seek an optimal level of disclosure (cont'd)

- ◆ **Financial disclosure (purely objective and analytical discussion)**
 - ✦ Required accounting disclosures
 - Simple description of how Phineas conducts business
 - Restated financial statements and footnotes
 - Include in a series of tables or charts
 - New accounting policies
 - Other information required by accounting / legal
 - ✦ Comparison of pre- and post restatement results for 2002, 2003, and 2004
 - Detailed accounting errors and other changes
 - Description of each category
 - Reconciliation by category
 - Line-by-line statement income statement reconciliation
 - Qualitative and quantitative
 - ✦ Core earnings or the non-GAAP measure discussion
 - Description of how core earnings non-GAAP measure is calculated
 - Effect of the restatement on core earnings non-GAAP measure
 - ✦ Key interest rate risk metrics
 - Definitions
 - Effect of the restatement on key interest rate metrics

Appendix

Valuation

Comparative market statistics

Institution	Ticker	7/11/2005 Market Cap	Forward 2006 P/E	Price / Book ^(a)	2006 PEG	Current Dividend Yield ^(b)
Government Sponsored Enterprises						
Phineas		\$57,164	8.3x	2.2x	83%	1.8%
Freddie Mac	FRE	\$45,529	9.4x	1.7x	99%	1.8%
Mortgage Banks						
Countrywide Financial Corp.	CFC	\$23,067	8.7x	2.2x	73%	1.4%
Indymac Bancorp Inc.	NDE	2,655	8.9	2.1	59	3.4
PHH Corp.	PHH	1,408	NA	0.7	NA	NM
Depositories w/ Mortgage Platforms						
Bank Of America Corp.	BAC	\$181,839	10.2x	1.8x	113%	4.0%
Wells Fargo & Co.	WFC	104,159	12.2	2.8	111	3.1
National City Corp.	NCC	22,425	10.8	1.8	135	4.0
North Fork Bancorporation	NFB	13,989	11.4	1.6	106	3.0
Multi-Family Banks						
New York Community Bancorp Inc.	NYB	\$4,902	12.0x	NM	120%	14.7%
Independence Community Bank Corp.	ICBC	3,110	12.0	1.4	120	7.6
Thriffs						
Washington Mutual Inc.	WM	\$35,895	10.3x	1.7x	103%	4.5%
Golden West Financial Corp.	GDW	20,223	12.3	2.8	98	0.4
Financial Guarantors						
MBIA Inc.	MBI	\$8,479	10.0x	1.3x	80%	1.8%
Ambac Financial Group	ABK	7,682	10.1	1.5	75	0.7
Assured Guaranty Ltd.	AGO	1,741	10.2	1.2	79	0.5
Mortgage Insurers						
MGIC Investment Corp.	MTG	\$6,153	9.7x	1.5x	81%	0.5%
Radian Group Inc.	RDN	4,146	8.4	1.2	70	0.2
PMI Group Inc.	PMI	3,703	8.6	1.2	71	0.5
Residential MBS REITs						
Annaly Mortgage Mgmt Inc.	NLY	\$2,131	10.2x	1.4x	203%	10.2%
Redwood Trust Inc.	RWT	1,313	7.8	1.5	97	15.6
MFA Mortgage Investments Inc.	MFA	592	8.8	0.9	195	10.0
Anworth Mtg Asset Corp.	ANH	467	8.3	1.0	NA	11.0
Luminent Mortgage Capital	LUM	417	8.3	1.0	NA	13.2
Commercial MBS REITs						
Newcastle Investment Corp.	NCT	\$1,323	9.9x	130.0x	105%	8.3%
Anthracite Capital Inc.	AHR	639	9.5	1.4	191	9.3
Capital Trust Inc.	CT	522	12.6	1.7	158	6.4

Source: IDD, SNL Datasource.

(a) Book Value as on December 31, 2004. Phineas book value equals \$35.5 billion total equity less \$9.108 billion in preferred shares, per Phineas management.

(b) Last quarter annualized.

Whole company public market valuation

(\$ in millions, except per share data)

	11-Jul-05		Price/			2006E	2006E
	Market Cap.	Price	2006E	Book Value	LT Growth Rate	PEG Ratio	Dividend Yield
Mortgage Banks							
Countrywide Financial Corporation (CFC)	\$23,067	\$39.25	8.7x	2.2x	12.0%	73%	1.6%
Phineas Reference ^(a)			\$6.79	\$26,392	10.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$59.25				
Mortgage Insurers							
MGIC Investment Corporation (MTG)	\$6,153	\$65.20	9.7x	1.5x	12.0%	81%	0.5%
Radian Group Inc. (RDN)	4,146	48.12	8.4	1.2	12.0	70	0.2
PMI Group, Inc. (PMI)	3,703	39.60	8.6	1.2	12.0	71	0.5
Phineas Reference ^(a)			\$6.79	\$26,392	10.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$58.16				
Thriffs							
Washington Mutual, Inc. (WM)	\$35,895	\$41.20	10.3x	1.7x	10.0%	103%	5.1%
Golden West Financial Corporation (GDW)	20,223	65.82	12.3	2.8	12.5	98	0.5
Phineas Reference ^(a)			\$6.79	\$26,392	10.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$76.76				
GSEs							
Freddie Mac (FRE)	\$45,529	\$66.13	9.4x	1.7x	9.5%	99%	2.3%
Phineas Reference ^(a)			\$6.79	\$26,392	10.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$63.71				




Source: Market Data from IDD and SNL. Earnings and dividend estimates for public companies from IBES.

(a) After-Tax Operating Earnings based on IBES estimates. Phineas' book value based on management estimates.




(b) Implied valuation based on median multiples and 967.90mm shares outstanding.

N.B. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Price to book vs ROE analysis for whole company, single family and multi family



Price to book vs ROE analysis for portfolio



Whole company discounted cash flow

Assumptions			
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Risk Free Rate	4.34%
Terminal Multiple	10.0x	Market Risk Premium	5.00
Phineas Cost of Equity ^(a)	7.7%	Beta	0.68
Projected Long Term Growth	5.0	Marginal Tax Rate	27.0%
Shares Outstanding (m)	968	Franchise Fee (After-tax)	5.0

DCF Analysis				
(\$ in millions)	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>
Projected EPS ^(b)	\$7.15	\$7.51	\$7.88	\$8.28
Implied Net Income	6,921	7,267	7,630	8,011
Franchise Fee (5% After-tax)	(346)	(363)	(381)	(401)
Net Income	\$6,574	\$6,903	\$7,248	\$7,611
Capital Retention Requirement ^(c)	(1,837)	(1,811)	(1,826)	(1,837)
Free Cash Flow	\$4,737	\$5,092	\$5,422	\$5,773
Terminal Value				80,113
Free Cash Flow/Net Income	68%	70%	71%	72%

Equity Value per Share **\$79.41**

Source: Bloomberg and IBES. Market data as of July 11, 2005. Capital projections based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) 2007-2009 EPS based on growth rate of 5.0%.

(c) Capital required calculated as 58.5 basis points against each of the single and multi-family books of business and 2.05% against assets in the portfolio.

Sensitivity Analysis						
		Terminal Multiple				
		8.0x	9.0x	10.0x	11.0x	12.0x
Cost of Equity	5.7%	\$71.81	\$78.43	\$85.06	\$91.68	\$98.30
	6.7	69.42	75.79	82.17	88.55	94.92
	7.7	67.13	73.27	79.41	85.56	91.70
	8.7	64.94	70.86	76.78	82.70	88.62
	9.7	62.84	68.55	74.25	79.96	85.67
		Implied Beta				
		0.28%	0.48	0.68	0.88	1.08

Single family: Public market valuation

(\$ in millions, except per share data)

	11-Jul-05		Price/			2006E	2006E
	Market Cap.	Price	2006E	Book Value	LT Growth Rate	PEG Ratio	Dividend Yield
Financial Guarantors							
MBIA, Inc. (MBI)	\$8,479	\$62.62	10.0x	1.3x	12.5%	80%	1.8%
Ambac Financial Group (ABK)	7,682	70.94	10.1	1.5	13.5	75	0.7
Assured Guaranty Ltd (AGO)	1,741	23.22	10.2	1.2	13.0	79	0.5
Single Family Reference ^(a)			\$3.03	\$12.285	5.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$30.50				
Mortgage Insurers							
MGIC Investment Corp. (MTG)	\$6,153	\$65.20	9.7x	1.5x	12.0%	81%	0.5%
Radian Group, Inc. (RDN)	4,146	48.12	8.4	1.2	12.0	70	0.2
PMI Group, Inc. (PMI)	3,703	39.60	8.6	1.2	12.0	71	0.5
Single Family Reference ^(a)			\$3.03	\$12.285	5.0%		
Implied Valuation per Share ^(b)			\$25.95				

Source: Market Data from IDD and SNL. Earnings and dividend estimates for public companies from IBES.

(a) After-Tax Operating Earnings and Book Value based on company projections.

(b) Implied valuation based on median multiples and 967.90mm shares outstanding.

N.B. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Single family discounted cash flow as a private company

Assumptions			
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Risk Free Rate	4.34%
Terminal Multiple	9.0x	Market Risk Premium	5.00
Phineas Cost of Equity ^(a)	9.7%	Adjusted Beta	1.07
Shares Outstanding (m)	968	Marginal Tax Rate	31.0%
Diluted Shares	1,019	Franchise Fee (After-tax)	5.0

DCF Analysis				
(\$ in millions)	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>
Pretax Income	\$3,384	\$3,017	\$2,482	\$1,974
Income Taxes	(1,049)	(935)	(769)	(612)
Franchise Fee (5% After-tax)	117	104	86	68
Net Income	\$2,452	\$2,186	\$1,798	\$1,430
Capital Retention Requirement (b)	\$23	\$1,464	\$1,284	\$1,125
Free Cash Flow	\$2,475	\$3,650	\$3,082	\$2,555
Terminal Value				13,257
Free Cash Flow/Net Income	101%	167%	171%	179%

Equity Value per Share	\$19.16
Equity Value Per Share Assuming Dilution From New Shareholders (c)	\$18.21

Source: Bloomberg. Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) Capital required calculated as 66.4 basis points against the single -family book of business.

(c) Assumes 50.852mm common shares are issued at market price to meet the additional capital requirement for the portfolio business.

Sensitivity Analysis						
		Terminal Multiple				
		7.0x	8.0x	9.0x	10.0x	11.0x
Cost of Equity	7.7%	\$17.16	\$18.23	\$19.31	\$20.38	\$21.46
	8.7	16.67	17.71	18.75	19.78	20.82
	9.7	16.21	17.21	18.21	19.21	20.20
	10.7	15.76	16.73	17.69	18.65	19.62
	11.7	15.33	16.26	17.19	18.12	19.05
						Implied Beta
						0.67%
						0.87
						1.07
						1.27
						1.47

Single family P&L – current configuration

Single Family P&L							
Projected for the year ended December 31,							
P&L Drivers (\$Billion)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
Ending SF MDO (a)	\$7,213	\$7,923	\$8,515	\$9,089	\$9,702	\$10,356	6.9%
Ending Fannie Mae SF BOB (b)	2,042	2,030	2,100	2,165	2,233	2,302	3.2
Average Book of Business	2,019	2,036	2,065	2,133	2,199	2,267	2.7
Required Regulatory Capital (c)	\$12	\$12	\$12	\$13	\$13	\$13	3.2
P&L (\$Million)							
Revenues	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
G-Fee Income (Includes Allocated G-Fees) (d)	\$4,452	\$4,686	\$4,839	\$5,067	\$5,282	\$5,492	4.0%
Net Fees/Other Inc. (CE expenses, Technology Fees) (e)	108	107	111	114	118	122	3.2
Total Non Interest Income	\$4,560	\$4,794	\$4,950	\$5,182	\$5,399	\$5,614	4.0%
Inc. on Capital (f)	\$806	\$430	\$509	\$538	\$566	\$595	8.5%
Other NII (Float, Stopped Interest, Other interest inc/exp) (g)	140	75	88	93	98	103	8.5
Total Interest Income	\$947	\$504	\$598	\$631	\$664	\$698	8.5%
Total Revenues	\$5,506	\$5,298	\$5,548	\$5,813	\$6,064	\$6,312	4.5%
Expenses							
Credit Loss Expense (h)	\$134	(\$333)	(\$352)	(\$450)	(\$483)	(\$548)	13.3%
Administrative Expenses (i)	(533)	(560)	(588)	(617)	(648)	(681)	5.0
Corporate Expense Allocation (i)	(534)	(561)	(589)	(618)	(649)	(682)	5.0
Total Expenses	(\$934)	(\$1,454)	(\$1,529)	(\$1,686)	(\$1,780)	(\$1,911)	7.1%
Pretax Income	\$4,572	\$3,844	\$4,019	\$4,127	\$4,283	\$4,401	3.4%
Tax (j)	(1,235)	(1,038)	(1,085)	(1,114)	(1,157)	(1,188)	3.4
Net Income	\$3,338	\$2,806	\$2,934	\$3,013	\$3,127	\$3,213	3.4%

Source: Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Projections reflect growth of 9.8% in 2005, 7.5% in 2006 and 6.7% thereafter.

(b) Projections reflect a 6.0% decline in 2005 and that Phineas captures a 46.1% share in the growth of single family MDO thereafter.

(c) Projections assume 0.45% + 30% surplus of end of year book of business.

(d) Projections assume guaranty fees of 22.1, 23.0, 23.4, 23.8, 24.0 and 24.2 basis points in 2004-2009.

(e) Projections assume growth at same rate as book of business.

(f) Based on forward 1-month LIBOR. Source: Bloomberg.

(g) Projections assume 17.33% on income on capital.

(h) Projections assume losses of (0.6), 1.6, 1.7, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 basis points in 2004-2009.

(i) Projections assume 5.0% growth rate.

(j) 27% tax rate.

Key Metrics	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Guaranty Fees (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	22	23	23	24	24	24
Losses (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	1	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Margin (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	23	21	22	22	22	22
Return on Required Capital (Pre-tax)	38.3%	32.4%	32.7%	32.6%	32.8%	32.7%
Return on Required Capital (After-tax)	27.9%	23.6%	23.9%	23.8%	23.9%	23.9%

Single family P&L as a private company

Single Family Private Company

P&L Drivers (\$Billion)	2004	2005	Pvt. Co. Projections for the yr ended Dec. 31,			
			2006	2007	2008	2009
Ending SF MDO (a)	\$7,213	\$7,923	\$8,515	\$9,089	\$9,702	\$10,356
Ending Fannie Mae SF BOB (b)	2,042	2,030	1,785	1,564	1,371	1,202
Average Book of Business	2,019	2,036	1,908	1,675	1,468	1,286
Required Regulatory Capital (c)	\$12	\$12	\$12	\$10	\$9	\$8
P&L (\$Million)						
Revenues	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
G-Fee Income (Includes Allocated G-Fees) (d)	\$4,452	\$4,686	\$4,177	\$3,973	\$3,520	\$3,111
Net Fees/Other Inc. (CE expenses, Technology Fees) (e)	108	107	111	114	118	122
Total Non Interest Income	\$4,560	\$4,794	\$4,288	\$4,088	\$3,638	\$3,233
Inc. on Capital (f)	\$806	\$430	\$491	\$441	\$395	\$353
Other NII (Float, Stopped Interest, Other interest inc/exp) (g)	140	75	85	76	68	61
Total Interest Income	\$947	\$504	\$577	\$518	\$463	\$414
Total Revenues	\$5,506	\$5,298	\$4,864	\$4,605	\$4,101	\$3,647
Expenses						
Credit Loss Expense (h)	\$134	(\$333)	(\$303)	(\$352)	(\$321)	(\$310)
Administrative Expenses (i)	(533)	(560)	(588)	(617)	(648)	(681)
Corporate Expense Allocation (i)	(534)	(561)	(589)	(618)	(649)	(682)
Total Expenses	(\$934)	(\$1,454)	(\$1,480)	(\$1,588)	(\$1,619)	(\$1,673)
Pretax Income	\$4,572	\$3,844	\$3,384	\$3,017	\$2,482	\$1,974
Tax (j)	(1,235)	(1,192)	(1,049)	(935)	(769)	(612)
Add Back: Franchise Fee (5% after-tax)	0	0	117	104	86	68
Net Income	\$3,338	\$2,652	\$2,452	\$2,186	\$1,798	\$1,430

Source: Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Projections reflect growth of 9.3% in 2005 and 6.6% thereafter.

(b) Projections reflect reduction in book of business by 15% per annum beginning in 2006.

(c) Projections assume 0.66% of end of year book of business.

(d) Projections assume guaranty fees of 22.1, 23.0, 23.4, 23.8, 24.0 and 24.2 basis points in 2004-2009.

(e) Projections assume growth at same rate as book of business.

(f) Based on forward 1-month LIBOR. Source: Bloomberg.

(g) Projections assume 17.33% on income on capital.

(h) Projections assume losses of (0.6), 1.6, 1.7, 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 basis points in 2004-2009.

(i) Projections assume 5.0% growth rate.

(j) 31% tax rate.

Key Metrics

Guaranty Fees (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	22	23	22	24	24	24
Losses (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	1	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
Margin (% of Avg. Book of Business, bps)	23	21	20	22	22	22
Return on Required Capital (Pre-tax)	38.7%	32.4%	28.6%	29.0%	27.3%	24.7%
Return on Required Capital (After-tax)	28.3%	22.3%	20.7%	21.0%	19.8%	17.9%

Multi family: Public market valuation

(\$ in millions, except per share data)

	11-Jul-05		Price /			2006E	2006E
	Market Cap.	Price	2006E	Book Value	LT Growth Rate	PEG Ratio	Dividend Yield
Financial Guarantors							
MBIA Inc. (MBI)	\$8,479	\$62.62	10.0x	1.3x	12.5%	80%	1.8%
Ambac Financial Group, Inc. (ABK)	7,682	70.94	10.1	1.5	13.5	75	0.7
Assured Guaranty Limited (AGO)	1,741	23.22	10.2	1.2	13.0	79	0.5
Multi-Family Reference (a)			\$0.29	\$749	3.0%		
Implied Valuation Per Share (b)			\$2.87				
Thriffs with Significant MF Platform							
Washington Mutual, Inc. (WM)	\$35,895	\$41.20	10.3x	1.7x	10.0%	103%	5.1%
New York Community Bancorp, Inc. (NYB)	4,902	18.46	12.0	NM	10.0	120	5.5
Independence Community Bank Corp. (ICCB)	3,110	37.05	12.0	1.4	10.0	120	3.1
Multi-Family Reference (a)			\$0.29	\$749	3.0%		
Implied Valuation Per Share (b)			\$3.41				

Source: Market Data from IDD and SNL. Earnings and dividend estimates for public companies from IBES.

(a) After-Tax Operating Earnings based on company projections.

(b) Implied valuation based on median multiples and 967.90mm shares outstanding.

N.B. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Multi family discounted cash-flow analysis – current configuration


Assumptions	
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005
Terminal Multiple	9.0x
Cost of Equity	7.7%
Shares Outstanding (m)	968
	Risk Free Rate 4.34%
	Market Risk Premium 5.00
	Phineas Beta 0.68
	Tax Rate 27.0%

DCF Analysis				
	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>
Pretax Income - Before Franchise Fee	\$379	\$396	\$398	\$413
Income Taxes	(102)	(107)	(107)	(112)
Net Income	277	289	290	302
Capital Retention Requirement ^(b)	(50)	(51)	(54)	(54)
Free Cash Flow	\$226	\$238	\$236	\$248
Terminal Value				2,795
Free Cash Flow/Net Income	82%	82%	81%	82%
Equity Value Per Share	\$2.96			

Source: Bloomberg. Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) Capital required calculated as 58.5 basis points against the multi-family book of business.



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DCF Analysis

Equity Value Per Share	\$2.79
Equity Value Per Share Assuming Dilution From New Shareholders (c)	\$2.65

(c) Assumes 50.852mm common shares are issued at market price to meet the additional capital requirement for the portfolio business.

Sensitivity Analysis



Multi family P&L – current configuration

Management Estimates

P&L Drivers (\$Billion)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
Multifamily MDO, End Balance (a)	\$601	\$637	\$669	\$703	\$738	\$775	5.0%
MF Book of Business, End Balance (b) (c)	110	120	128	137	146	155	6.8
Average Book of Business	103	115	124	132	141	151	7.0
Regulatory Capital (d)	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	0.9	6.8

P&L (\$Million)

Revenues	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
Guaranty Fees (incl. CE Fee which was included in Other income) (e)	\$419	\$446	\$471	\$499	\$529	\$559	5.8%
Other Income (excl. CE fee) (f)	96	102	107	114	121	128	5.8
Total Non Interest Income	\$514	\$548	\$578	\$613	\$650	\$687	5.8%
Income on Capital (g)	\$16	\$20	\$31	\$34	\$37	\$40	18.5%
Float (h)	9	20	31	34	37	40	18.5
Total Interest Income	\$25	\$41	\$62	\$68	\$74	\$80	18.5%
Total Revenue	\$539	\$589	\$640	\$681	\$724	\$767	6.8%
Expenses							
Credit Loss Expense (i)	(\$45)	(\$84)	(\$90)	(\$96)	(\$117)	(\$124)	10.4%
Administrative Expenses (j)	(60)	(70)	(80)	(92)	(105)	(120)	14.2
Corporate Expense Allocation (k)	(78)	(85)	(91)	(97)	(104)	(110)	6.8
Total Expenses	(\$184)	(\$239)	(\$261)	(\$285)	(\$326)	(\$354)	10.4%
Pretax Income - Before Franchise Fee	\$356	\$350	\$379	\$396	\$398	\$413	4.2%
Tax (l)	(96)	(94)	(102)	(107)	(107)	(112)	4.2
Net Income	\$260	\$255	\$277	\$289	\$290	\$302	4.2%

Source: Based on assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Based on 6% growth in 2005 and 5% thereafter.

(b) Liquidations projected by management to be 6.1%, 5.8%, 5.4%, 6.0% and 4.7% from 2005 to 2009.

(c) Assumes Phineas has 20% market share of future acquisitions and 45% share of MF BOB churn.

(d) Projections assume 0.45% + 30% surplus of end of year book of business.

(e) Based on projected guaranty fees of 0.38% for 2004, 0.37% for 2005 and 2006, 0.36% thereafter.

(f) Assumed to be 22.8% of guaranty fees.

(g) Based on forward 1-month LIBOR. Source: Bloomberg.

(h) Based on prior year income on capital.

(i) Assumed to be 0.07% from 2005 to 2007, and 0.08% from 2008 to 2009.

(j) Assumed to be 0.06% from 2005 to 2006, 0.07% from 2007 to 2008, and 0.8% thereafter.

(k) Assumed to be 0.07%.

(l) Assume tax rate of 27%.

Key Metrics

Guaranty Fees (% of End Book of Business, bps)	38	37	37	36	36	36
Losses (% of End Book of Business, bps)	(4)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)
Margin (% of End Book of Business, bps)	34	30	30	29	28	28
Return on Required Capital (Pre-tax)	55.2%	50.0%	50.6%	49.4%	46.5%	45.5%
Return on Required Capital (After-tax)	40.3	36.5	36.9	36.1	34.0	33.2

Multi family P&L as a private company

Management Estimates							
P&L Drivers (\$Billion)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
Multifamily MDO, End Balance (a)	\$601	\$637	\$602	\$632	\$664	\$697	2.3%
MF Book of Business, End Balance (b) (c)	110	120	126	137	146	155	6.8
Average Book of Business	103	115	124	132	141	151	7.0
Regulatory Capital (d)	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	10.2
P&L (\$Million)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR 05-09
Revenues							
Guaranty Fees (incl. CE Fee which was included in Other income) (e)	\$419	\$446	\$474	\$493	\$526	\$559	5.8%
Other Income (excl. CE fee) (f)	96	102	108	112	120	128	5.8
Total Non Interest Income	\$514	\$548	\$582	\$605	\$646	\$687	5.8%
Income on Capital (g)	\$16	\$20	\$35	\$39	\$42	\$46	22.3%
Float (h)	9	20	31	34	37	40	18.5
Total Interest Income	\$25	\$41	\$66	\$73	\$79	\$86	20.4%
Total Revenue	\$539	\$589	\$648	\$678	\$725	\$772	7.0%
Expenses							
Credit Loss Expense (i)	(\$45)	(\$64)	(\$90)	(\$96)	(\$117)	(\$124)	10.4%
Administrative Expenses (j)	(60)	(70)	(57)	(62)	(67)	(72)	0.5
Corporate Expense Allocation (k)	(78)	(85)	(104)	(119)	(136)	(155)	16.2
Total Expenses	(\$184)	(\$239)	(\$251)	(\$277)	(\$320)	(\$351)	10.1%
Pretax Income	\$356	\$350	\$397	\$401	\$405	\$422	4.8%
Tax (l)	(110)	(94)	(123)	(124)	(126)	(131)	8.5
Add Back: Mission Costs (5% After-tax)	0	0	14	14	14	15	NM
Net Income	\$245	\$255	\$288	\$290	\$294	\$305	4.6%

Source: Based on assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Based on 10% reduction after a 6% annual growth in 2005 and 5% thereafter.

(b) Liquidations projected by management to be 6.1%, 5.8%, 5.4%, 6.0% and 4.7% from 2005 to 2009.

(c) Assumes Phineas has 20% market share of future acquisitions and 45% share of MF BOB churn.

(d) Projections assume 0.45% + 30% surplus of end of year book of business.

(e) Based on projected guaranty fees of 0.38% for 2004, 0.37% for 2005 and 2006, 0.36% thereafter.

(f) Assumed to be 22.8% of guaranty fees.

(g) Based on forward 1-month LIBOR. Source: Bloomberg.

(h) Based on prior year income on capital.

(i) Assumed to be 0.07% from 2005 to 2007, and 0.08% from 2008 to 2009.

(j) Assumed to be 0.06% from 2005 to 2006, 0.07% from 2007 to 2008, and 0.8% thereafter.

(k) Assumed to be 0.08% from 2005 to 2006, 0.09% from 2007 to 2008, and 0.10% thereafter.

(l) Assume tax rate of 31%.

Key Metrics

Guaranty Fees (% of End Book of Business, bps)	38	37	37	36	36	36
Losses (% of End Book of Business, bps)	(4)	(7)	(7)	(7)	(8)	(8)
Margin (% of End Book of Business, bps)	34	30	30	29	28	28
Return on Required Capital (Pre-tax)	55.2%	50.0%	46.7%	44.1%	41.8%	40.9%
Return on Required Capital (After-tax)	38.1	36.5	33.8	32.0	30.3	29.6



Portfolio: Public market valuation

(\$ in millions, except per share data)

	11-Jul-05		Price/ 2006E	Long Term Growth Rate	2006E PEG Ratio	2006E Dividend Yield
	Market Cap	Price				
REIT, RMBS Portfolio Managers						
Annaly Mortgage Management, Inc. (NLY)	\$2,131	\$17.57	10.2x	5.0%	203%	9.5%
Redwood Trust, Inc. (RWT)	1,313	53.37	7.8	8.0	97	12.4
MFA Mortgage Investments, Inc. (MFA)	592	7.19	8.8	4.5	195	10.3
Anworth Mortgage Asset Corporation (ANH)	467	9.85	8.3	NM	NM	11.2
Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. (LUM)	417	10.90	8.3	NM	NM	12.6
Portfolio Reference (a)			\$3.78		\$4.893	
Implied Valuation per Share			\$31.59		\$45.27	
REIT, CMBS Portfolio Managers						
Newcastle Investment Corp. (NCT)	\$1,323	\$30.23	9.9x	9.5%	105%	7.8%
Anthracite Capital, Inc. (AHR)	639	11.98	9.5	5.0	191	9.8
Capital Trust, Inc. (CT)	522	34.50	12.6	8.0	158	7.3
Portfolio Reference (a)			\$3.78			
Implied Valuation per Share			\$37.57			
Banks with Mortgage Platform						
Bank of America Corporation (BAC)	\$181,839	\$45.17	10.2x	9.0%	113%	4.5%
Wells Fargo & Company (WFC)	104,159	61.73	12.2	11.0	111	3.5
National City Corporation (NCC)	22,425	35.22	10.8	8.0	135	4.3
North Fork Bancorporation, Inc. (NFB)	13,989	29.29	11.4	10.8	106	3.5
Portfolio Reference (a)			\$3.78			
Implied Valuation per Share			\$42.13			

Source: Market Data from IDD and SNL. Earnings Estimates for public companies from IBES.

(a) After-tax net income: Citigroup projections model based on management assumptions. Reference income for dividend yield valuation equals 2006E pre-tax income*95%, less franchise less preferred dividends.

N.B. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Portfolio: Public market valuation (cont'd)

(\$ in millions, except per share data)

	11-Jul-05		Price/ 2006E	Long Term Growth Rate	2006E PEG Ratio	2006E Dividend Yield
	Market Cap	Price				
Total						
Washington Mutual, Inc. (WM)	\$35,895	\$41.20	10.3x	10.0%	103%	5.1%
Golden West Financial Corporation (GDW)	20,223	65.82	12.3	12.5	98	0.5
Portfolio Reference (a)			\$3.78			
Implied Valuation per Share			\$42.77			

Source: Market Data from IDD and SNL. Earnings Estimates for public companies from IBES.
 (a) After-tax net income: Citigroup projections model based on management assumptions. Reference income for dividend yield valuation equals 2006E pre-tax income*95%, less franchise less preferred dividends.
 N.B. Market data as of July 11, 2005.

Portfolio: Discounted cash flow – current configuration

Assumptions				
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Risk Free Rate	4.34%	
Terminal Multiple (Price / Book)	1.2x	Market Risk Premium	5.00	
Phineas Cost of Equity (a)	7.7%	Beta	0.68	
Shares	968	Tax Rate	27.0%	
DCF Analysis				
<u>Revenues</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>
Pretax Income	\$5,589	\$6,271	\$6,456	\$6,325
Income Taxes	(1,509)	(1,693)	(1,743)	(1,708)
Preferred Dividends	(417)	(375)	(358)	(309)
Net Income	\$3,663	\$4,203	\$4,355	\$4,308
Capital Retention Requirement (b)	(\$1,378)	(\$300)	(\$970)	\$0
Free Cash Flow	\$2,286	\$3,903	\$3,385	\$4,308
Terminal Value				\$20,349
Free Cash Flow / Net Income	62%	93%	78%	100%
Equity Value Per Share				\$27.37
Terminal Value As A % Of Equity Value				66.2%

Source: Bloomberg. Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) Capital required calculated as 2.67% against assets in the portfolio.

(c) Assumes 967.904mm shares outstanding.

Sensitivity Analysis						
		Terminal Multiple				
		1.0x	1.1x	1.2x	1.3x	1.4x
Cost of Equity	5.7%	\$26.37	\$27.78	\$29.18	\$30.58	\$31.98
	6.7	25.55	26.90	28.25	29.60	30.95
	7.7	24.77	26.07	27.37	28.67	29.97
	8.7	24.02	25.27	26.52	27.78	29.03
	9.7	23.30	24.50	25.71	26.92	28.13
		Implied Beta				
		0.28%	0.48	0.68	0.88	1.08

Value of portfolio business without the charter: Bank

Assumptions				
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Rf	4.34%	
Terminal Multiple (Price / Book)	1.2x	Market Risk Premium	5.00	
Phineas "Bank" Cost of Equity (a)	8.4%	Beta	0.82	
Shares	968	Tax Rate	31.0%	
Diluted Shares	1,019			
DCF Analysis				
Revenues	2006	2007	2008	2009
Pretax Income	\$3,861	\$3,243	\$2,803	\$2,204
Income Taxes	(1,197)	(1,005)	(869)	(683)
Preferred Dividends	(417)	(375)	(358)	(309)
Net Income	\$2,247	\$1,863	\$1,576	\$1,212
Capital Retention Requirement	(\$7,862)	\$5,462	\$3,002	\$2,847
Free Cash Flow	(\$5,615)	\$7,325	\$4,578	\$4,059
Terminal Value				\$7,544
Free Cash Flow / Net Income	(250%)	393%	291%	335%
Equity Value				\$13,045
Equity Value Per Share				\$13.48
Equity Value Per Share Assuming Dilution From New Shareholders (c)				\$12.90
Terminal Value As A % Of Equity Value				49.2%

Source: Bloomberg. Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) Capital required calculated as 5.00% against assets in the portfolio.

(c) Assumes 50.852mm common shares are issued at market price to meet the additional capital requirement.

Sensitivity Analysis						
		Terminal Multiple				
		1.0x	1.1x	1.2x	1.3x	1.4x
Cost of Equity	6.4%	\$12.82	\$13.30	\$13.78	\$14.26	\$14.74
	7.4	12.36	12.82	13.28	13.75	14.21
	8.4	11.91	12.36	12.80	13.25	13.70
	9.4	11.49	11.92	12.35	12.78	13.21
	10.4	11.08	11.49	11.91	12.32	12.74
		Implied Beta				
		0.44%	0.64	0.84	1.04	1.24

Value of portfolio business without the charter: REIT

Assumptions				
Valuation Date	31-Dec-2005	Rf	4.34%	
Terminal Multiple (Price / Book)	1.2x	Market Risk Premium	5.00	
Phineas "REIT" Cost of Equity (a)	7.4%	Beta	0.62	
Shares	968	Tax Rate	0.0%	
Diluted Shares	1,398			
DCF Analysis				
<u>Revenues</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>
Pretax Income	\$4,238	\$3,497	\$3,852	\$3,046
Income Taxes	0	0	0	0
Preferred Dividends	(417)	(375)	(358)	(309)
Net Income	<u>\$3,821</u>	<u>\$3,123</u>	<u>\$3,493</u>	<u>\$2,737</u>
Capital Retention Requirement	(\$31,841)	\$11,224	\$6,975	\$5,695
Free Cash Flow	(\$28,020)	\$14,347	\$10,468	\$8,432
Terminal Value				\$21,220
Free Cash Flow / Net Income	(733%)	459%	300%	308%
Equity Value				\$17,091
Equity Value Per Share				\$17.66
Equity Value Per Share Assuming Dilution From New Shareholders (c)				\$12.22
Terminal Value As A % Of Equity Value				107.7%

Source: Bloomberg. Based on projections and assumptions provided by Phineas management.

(a) Calculated using the capital asset pricing model.

(b) Capital required calculated as 10.00% against assets in the portfolio.

(c) Assumes 430.211mm common shares are issued at market price to meet the additional capital requirement.

Sensitivity Analysis						
	Terminal Multiple					
	1.0x	1.1x	1.2x	1.3x	1.4x	
5.4%	\$11.76	\$12.78	\$13.81	\$14.83	\$15.86	0.21%
6.4	11.02	12.01	13.00	13.98	14.97	0.41%
7.4	10.32	11.27	12.22	13.18	14.13	0.61%
8.4	9.65	10.57	11.49	12.40	13.32	0.81%
9.4	9.02	9.90	10.78	11.67	12.55	1.01%

Portfolio P&L – current configuration

PORTFOLIO P&L

P&L Drivers (\$ billion)	2006	2007	2008	2009	CAGR '06 - '09
Portfolio Balance (a)	\$828	\$828	\$828	\$828	0.0%
Required Capital (b)	\$22.1	\$22.1	\$22.1	\$22.1	0.0%
Preferred Stock	6.4	6.1	5.1	5.1	(7.1%)
Common Stock	\$15.7	\$16.0	\$17.0	\$17.0	2.6%
P&L (\$ million)					
Revenues					CAGR '06 - '09
Net Interest Income	\$5,930	\$6,623	\$6,819	\$6,700	4.2%
Administrative Expenses (c)	(\$176)	(\$186)	(\$197)	(\$209)	6.0%
Corporate Expense Allocation (c)	(166)	(166)	(166)	(166)	0.0
Total Expenses	(\$341)	(\$352)	(\$363)	(\$375)	3.2%
Pretax Income	\$5,589	\$6,271	\$6,456	\$6,325	4.2%
Income Taxes	(1,509)	(1,693)	(1,743)	(1,708)	4.2
Core Earnings Before Pref. Dividends	\$4,080	\$4,578	\$4,713	\$4,617	4.2%
Preferred Dividends (d)	(\$417)	(\$375)	(\$358)	(\$309)	(9.5%)
Core Earnings After Pref. Dividends	\$3,663	\$4,203	\$4,355	\$4,308	5.6%

Source: 2000 - 2004 data provided by Phineas management on 04.27.2005 and projections based on assumptions as outlined by Phineas management. Forward interest & swap rates from Bloomberg.

(a) 2000 - 2004 reflects average annual balance ; Projections reflects no growth in portfolio balance, beginning with an \$828 billion balance at May 31, 2005.

(b) Projections assume 2.05% + 30% surplus, of end of year portfolio balance.

(c) Assumes 2 bps (as a % of end of year portfolio balance) beginning in 2005, and that administrative expenses grow at 6.00% per year and corporate expenses remain at 2 bps. Includes the 5.0% after-tax franchise fee in 2006 - 2009.

(d) Based on actual dividends reported for the nine months ended 09.30.2004 of \$124mm plus \$42 in estimated dividends for the fourth quarter. Assumes callable preferreds are called by Phineas.

Portfolio P&L without charter: Bank

PORTFOLIO P&L					
<u>P&L Drivers (\$ billion)</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>CAGR '06 - '09</u>
Portfolio Balance (a)	\$480	\$364	\$285	\$228	(22.0%)
Required Capital (b)	\$24.0	\$18.2	\$14.2	\$11.4	(22.0%)
Preferred Stock	\$6.4	\$6.1	\$5.1	\$5.1	
Common Stock	\$17.6	\$12.1	\$9.1	\$6.3	
<u>P&L (\$ million)</u>					
<u>Revenues</u>					<u>CAGR '06 - '09</u>
Interest Income On Capital	\$464	\$361	\$288	\$235	(20.3%)
Net Interest Income On Assets	\$3,627	\$3,055	\$2,650	\$2,078	(16.9%)
Net Interest Income	\$4,091	\$3,417	\$2,939	\$2,313	(16.9%)
<u>Expenses</u>					
Administrative Expenses (c)	(\$117)	(\$90)	(\$71)	(\$58)	(21.0%)
Corporate Expense Allocation (c)	(114)	(84)	(65)	(51)	(23.3%)
Total Expenses	(\$231)	(\$174)	(\$136)	(\$109)	(22.1%)
Pretax Income	\$3,861	\$3,243	\$2,803	\$2,204	(17.0%)
Income Taxes	(1,197)	(1,005)	(869)	(683)	(17.0%)
Core Earnings Before Pref. Dividends	\$2,664	\$2,238	\$1,934	\$1,521	(17.0%)
Preferred Dividends (d)	(\$417)	(\$375)	(\$358)	(\$309)	(9.5%)
Core Earnings After Pref. Dividends	\$2,247	\$1,863	\$1,576	\$1,212	(18.6%)

Source: 2000 - 2004 data provided by Phineas management on 04.27.2005 and projections based on assumptions as outlined by Phineas management. Forward interest & swap rates from Bloomberg.

(a) 2000 - 2004 reflects average annual balance ; Projections reflect a run-off scenario, beginning with a \$656 billion balance at year-end 2005.

(b) Assumes that 2000 - 2004 reflects annual balance ; Projections assume 5.00% of end of year portfolio balance.

(c) Assumes 2 bps (as a % of end of year portfolio balance) beginning in 2005, and that administrative expenses grow at 6.00% per year and corporate expenses remain at 2 bps. Assumes that a 5.0% after-tax franchise fee is included in administrative expenses beginning in 2006.

(d) Based on actual dividends reported for the nine months ended 09.30.2004 of \$124mm plus \$42 in estimated dividends for the fourth quarter. Assumes callable preferreds are called by Phineas.

Portfolio P&L without charter: REIT

Portfolio P&L					
<u>P&L Drivers (\$ billion)</u>	<u>2006</u>	<u>2007</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2009</u>	<u>CAGR '06 - '09</u>
Portfolio Balance (a)	\$480	\$364	\$285	\$228	(22.0%)
Required Capital (b)	\$48.0	\$36.4	\$28.5	\$22.8	(22.0%)
Preferred Stock	\$6.4	\$6.1	\$5.1	\$5.1	
Common Stock	\$41.6	\$30.4	\$23.4	\$17.7	
P&L (\$ million)					
					<u>CAGR '06 - '09</u>
Revenues					(7.8%)
Interest Income on Capital (c)	\$1,458	\$1,135	\$906	\$739	(20.3%)
Net Interest Income On Assets	3,010	2,536	3,082	2,416	(7.1%)
Net Interest Income	\$4,469	\$3,671	\$3,987	\$3,155	
Expenses					
Administrative Expenses (c)	(\$117)	(\$90)	(\$71)	(\$58)	(21.0%)
Corporate Expense Allocation (c)	(114)	(84)	(65)	(51)	(23.3%)
Total Expenses	(\$231)	(\$174)	(\$136)	(\$109)	(22.1%)
Pretax Income	\$4,238	\$3,497	\$3,852	\$3,046	(10.4%)
Income Taxes (d)	0	0	0	0	NM
Core Earnings Before Pref. Dividends	\$4,238	\$3,497	\$3,852	\$3,046	(10.4%)
Preferred Dividends (e)	(\$417)	(\$375)	(\$358)	(\$309)	(9.5%)
Core Earnings After Pref. Dividends	\$3,821	\$3,123	\$3,493	\$2,737	(10.5%)

Source: 2000 - 2004 data provided by Phineas management on 04.27.2005 and projections based on assumptions as outlined by Phineas management. Forward interest & swap rates from Bloomberg.

(a) 2000 - 2004 reflects average annual balance ; Projections reflect a run-off scenario, beginning with a \$656 billion balance at year-end 2005.

(b) Assumes that 2000 - 2004 reflects annual balance ; Projections assume 10.00% of end of year portfolio balance.

(c) Assumes 2 bps (as a % of end of year portfolio balance) beginning in 2005, and that administrative expenses grow at 6.00% per year and corporate expenses remain at 2 bps.

Assumes that a 5.0% after-tax franchise fee is included in administrative expenses beginning in 2006.

(d) Assumes 100% of income is distributed to shareholders.

(e) Based on actual dividends reported for the nine months ended 09.30.2004 of \$124mm plus \$42 in estimated dividends for the fourth quarter. Assumes callable preferreds are called by Phineas.

Alternative Approaches To Charter Valuation


Case Study: WestLB

- WestLB is one of Germany's leading financial services providers with total assets of € 253.8BN as at December 31, 2004, WestLB focuses on lending, structured finance, capital market and private equity products, private banking, asset management, transaction services and real estate finance.
- In July 2001, as a result of a state aid inquiry of the EU Commission the German government abolished the state guarantee provided to German Landesbanks granting them a transition phase of four years until July 18, 2005. Most liabilities outstanding on July 18, 2005 will be "grandfathered" with the state guarantee.
- S&P believes that the credit rating of WestLB will decrease by 3 notches from AA- to A- after the elimination of guarantor liability.
- Fitch believes that the long term rating of West LB is likely to fall in a A- while Moody's indicated that non-guaranteed long term rating of West LB will decrease by 2 notches from Aa2 to A1.


Ratings				Bank regulatory capital ratios (BIS)			
	With guarantor liability		Without guarantor liability		3/31/2005	12/31/2004	Change € billions
	Short term	Long term	Long term				
Moody's	P-1	Aa2	A1	Core capital (€ billions)	7.5	7.6	-0.1
Standard & Poor's	A-1+	AA-	A-	Capital and reserves (€ billions)	14.3	14.6	-0.3
Fitch Ratings	F1+	AAA	A-	Risk-weighted assets (€ billions)	122.4	118	4.4
				Core capital ratio (%)	7.8	8.1	
				Equity ratio (%)	11.7	12.4	

P/E franchise factor model: Phineas over time


Base P/E and Franchise P/E



Implied growth



Post charter value impact: ROE



(1): 5 year weekly adjusted Beta.
 (2): We assumed a risk free rate of 4.34% and an equity market risk premium of 5%.
 (3): Growth: we use Phineas median implied growth for the 1998-2004 period.
 (4): ROE: 3 – year average ROE as of June 2004 (pre-restatement)
 (5): NTM EPS estimate: \$6.95 per share, number of shares outstanding: 968mm.

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