

crisis some features that generate moral hazard incentives can decrease bank stability. We find an inverse U-shaped relation with bank stability decreasing at high levels of coverage during the crisis period. However, our evidence also suggests that the introduction of temporary measures like blanket guarantees are crucial to avoid panic among depositors and restore stability. Finally, our results seem to imply that the stabilizing effect of deposit insurance can be different along the economic cycle, so regulators should consider that to be able to achieve an optimal DIS that minimizes moral hazard incentives a 'dynamic' approach may be necessary.

**Q KEYWORDS:** Deposit insurance bank stability European banking financial crisis

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